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“Water is Life!” (and Speech!):  
Death, Dissent, and Democracy in the Borderlands 
JASON A. CADE* 
Decades of stringent immigration enforcement along the Southwest border have 
pushed migrants into perilous desert corridors. Thousands have died in border 
regions, out of the general public view, yet migrants continue to attempt the 
dangerous crossings. In response to what they see as a growing humanitarian crisis, 
activists from organizations such as No More Deaths seek to expand migrant access 
to water, to honor the human remains of those who did not survive the journey, and 
to influence public opinion about border enforcement policies. Government officials, 
however, have employed a range of tactics to repress this border-policy “dissent,” 
including blacklists, water destruction, and aggressive arrests and prosecutions.  
This Article argues that the context around No More Deaths’ work necessitates 
First Amendment scrutiny of government attempts to suppress or punish it. No More 
Deaths’ expressive conduct, carried out in the lethal areas where migrants have been 
funneled, aims not only to save lives but also to convey the message that all lives—
including those of unauthorized migrants—are worth saving. After untangling the 
complex constitutional subdoctrines, the Article explains the argument’s broader 
implications for democratic knowledge and debate about the ethics of border 
policies. As increased border fortification and militarization lead migrants to 
attempt even more dangerous land and water crossings, Americans will increasingly 
be asked to consider whether humanitarian aid should be a crime. This debate-
generating function of No More Deaths’ nonviolent, symbolic dissent regarding an 
area of inchoate but intense public concern aligns it with classical values that lie at 
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INTRODUCTION 
Decades of ever-more stringent immigration enforcement along the Southwest 
border between the United States and Mexico have pushed migrants into perilous 
desert corridors. In the remote, deadly stretches beyond Ajo, Arizona, for example, 
intrepid hikers regularly encounter the bones and belongings of border crossers who 
perished on journeys of almost eighty miles.1 In the last two decades, over seven 
thousand migrants have died in border regions within the United States, a fact that 
remains mostly unknown to the general public.2 With anti-immigrant rhetoric 
growing louder and enforcement measures growing harsher, the pressure on migrants 
to risk their lives in the desert will only increase.3 
 
 
 1. #WaterNotWalls, NO MORE DEATHS, https://nomoredeaths.org/legal-defense 
-campaign/waternotwalls [https://perma.cc/K5ZQ-UQ2R]. 
 2. Brad Jones, Migration Policies, UC DAVIS GLOBAL MIGRATION CTR., 
https://globalmigration.ucdavis.edu/migration-policies [https://perma.cc/PT7W-LR48]. 
 3. See Reynaldo Leaños Jr., U.S. Border Patrol Finds 4 Bodies, Including 3 Children, 
Near Rio Grande in Texas, NPR (June 24, 2019, 11:12 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/24 
/735391805/u-s-border-patrol-finds-4-bodies-including-3-children-near-rio-grande-in-texas 
[https://perma.cc/FBV5-M6W7]; Patrick J. McDonnell, Death at the Border: 4 from 
Guatemala, 3 of Them Children, Succumb to Heat in Texas, L.A. TIMES (July 8, 2019, 3:00 
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In response to this humanitarian crisis, activists from organizations such as No 
More Deaths (NMD) trek deep into the treacherous desert, seeking to expand migrant 
access to water and medical aid; to document and honor the human remains of those 
who did not survive the journey; and, ultimately, to exert influence on public opinion 
about border enforcement policies.4 In this Article, I examine this activity and argue 
that the actions engaged in by NMD members transcend the private, utilitarian efforts 
of good Samaritans. Their conduct and the extensive messaging around it are, in fact, 
deeply expressive. In a pointed and meaningful way, they act as citizen dissenters, 
engaging in a form of open protest at the precise location where their government is 
pursuing policies that the members morally condemn and desire to change. In 
particular, the group seeks to convey the messages that no human should be denied 
life-saving aid or respectful treatment when they die, that awareness should be raised 
about the suffering caused by militarization of the border, and that immigration 
policies should become more humane. By exposing the otherwise hidden and deadly 
consequences of such policies, these activists hope to challenge widespread outlooks 
about government rhetoric and enforcement practices and to advance the proposition 
that humanitarian aid is never a crime. 
For many years, groups such as NMD operated in a delicate balance with federal 
authorities in the borderlands. By and large these groups were permitted to engage 
in their protest and humanitarian activities, although to be sure there has long been 
friction with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). CBP agents routinely 
destroy the water jugs left by volunteers along migration routes.5 In turn, NMD 
publishes scathing reports and videos documenting CBP practices,6 scrawls 
messages (e.g. “Water is Life!”) to agents on the jugs it replaces, and continues its 
grueling marches into the borderlands. 
This uneasy toleration changed, however, with the election of Donald Trump and 
the appointment of Attorney General Jeff Sessions. Early in his tenure, Sessions 
made clear that the Trump administration would punish anyone who provides aid to 
migrants.7 Soon thereafter, government officials who manage federal lands in the 
area changed access rules and even blacklisted suspected members of NMD seeking 





 4. About No More Deaths, NO MORE DEATHS, https://nomoredeaths.org/about-no-more 
-deaths [https://perma.cc/56UT-LHWG] [hereinafter About No More Deaths]. 
 5. See infra Section II.B; see also Part II: Interference with Humanitarian Aid, NO MORE 
DEATHS, http://www.thedisappearedreport.org/uploads/8/3/5/1/83515082/disappeared_report 
_part_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TNJ-AQUP]. 
 6. Abuse Documentation, NO MORE DEATHS http://forms.nomoredeaths.org/abuse 
-documentation/ [https://perma.cc/VPZ3-QLL7]. 
 7. See infra Section II.B.2. 
 8. See infra Sections II.B.1 and III.B.2; see also Ryan Devereaux, As Trial Starts for 
Border Humanitarian Volunteers, New Documents Reveal Federal Bureaucrats’ Obsession 
with Stopping Activists, INTERCEPT (Jan. 17, 2019, 6:45 AM), 
https://theintercept.com/2019/01/17/no-more-deaths-border-documents-trial 
[https://perma.cc/SX8E-C38B]. 
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Arizona U.S. Attorney’s aggressive prosecutions of humanitarian protestors for 
charges ranging from misdemeanor littering to felony harboring.9 
Lost in any coverage or analysis of these events on the border thus far is an 
examination of the free speech concerns raised by NMD’s dissenting conduct in the 
desert and the government’s attempts to suppress and punish it. This is not entirely 
surprising. Many would assume that activities such as distributing water or honoring 
the remains of those who have perished in the desert are purely instrumental and 
therefore outside the reach of the First Amendment. Furthermore, NMD volunteers 
have defended against criminal prosecution not by invoking free speech concerns but 
by relying on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),10 advancing the 
argument that their conscience compels them to provide aid to those in distress.  
Indeed, in February 2020, a district court judge reversed some of the activists’ 
convictions pursuant to RFRA, finding that the regulations on access to and use of 
the federal lands substantially burdened their sincerely held religious beliefs.11 NMD 
is an official ministry of the Unitarian Universalist Church of Tucson, which has 
adopted “Faith-Based Principles for Immigration Reform” that substantially overlap 
with its members’ political beliefs about the harmful consequences of immigration 
policy.12 
This was an important victory for religious liberty.13 It remains crucial, however, 
to explore the implications of NMD’s activities as expression also covered by the 
First Amendment. Not all activists engaged in expressive humanitarian activity will 
have overlapping religious beliefs. Therefore, an analysis rooted in the Free Speech 
Clause might reveal the limits of the government’s latitude to punish expressive 
rights in a way that does not favor religious dissenters over secular ones. 
Additionally, RFRA provides only statutory relief, which is ultimately less durable 
than a constitutional claim.14 
 
 
 9. Kristine Phillips, They Left Food and Water for Migrants in the Desert. Now They 
Might Go to Prison., WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2019, 2:52 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/nation/2019/01/20/they-left-food-water-migrants-desert-now-they-might-go-prison/ 
[https://perma.cc/RJV3-PUJX]. 
 10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2012). 
 11. United States v. Hoffman, 436 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1289 (D. Ariz. 2020).  
 12. Faith-Based Principles for Immigration Reform, NO MORE DEATHS, 
https://nomoredeaths.org/about-no-more-deaths/faith-based-principles-for-immigration 
-reform/ [https://perma.cc/3UJ4-9JA7] (“These tragic and unnecessary deaths must stop. The 
border blockade strategy has militarized the US–Mexico border, which drives migrants into 
remote desert regions yet has failed to stem the flow of immigrants into the United States.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Elizabeth Reiner Platt, Katherine Franke, Kira Shepherd & Lilia 
Hadjiivanova, Whose Faith Matters? The Fight for Religious Liberty Beyond the Christian 
Right, COLUM. L. SCH.: LAW, RTS., & RELIGION PROJECT, Nov. 2019, at 6 (“[A]dvocates, 
legislators, courts, and journalists have contributed to a climate in which only the religious 
liberty claims of conservative people of faith ‘count’ as religious, while the claims and rights 
of progressive people of faith are dismissed or ignored as ‘merely’ political in nature.”). 
 14. The recent success of some of the NMD defendants’ RFRA claims does not preclude, 
or render superfluous, the free speech issues. Expressive, political, and religious beliefs are no 
“less deserving of protection merely because they may overlap.” Hoffman, 436 F. Supp. 3d at 
1284; see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (upholding 
petitioners’ objection to contraception mandate on the basis of sincerely held religious beliefs 
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As I show in this Article, much of NMD’s humanitarian work is sufficiently 
expressive to trigger Free Speech Clause coverage. As a doctrinal matter, expressive 
conduct is often said to qualify as speech within the First Amendment if (1) the actor 
intends to convey a message, and (2) the context surrounding an activity would lead 
a reasonable person to perceive the conduct as conveying some sort of message.15 In 
reality, the coverage question turns on nothing more or less than deep engagement 
with the contextual circumstances in which the particular conduct is undertaken.16 
The context surrounding NMD’s key conduct suggests that First Amendment 
attempts to suppress scrutiny of government are warranted. Specifically, NMD’s 
expressive acts of sharing water and honoring the deceased, directed at the heart of 
the deadly zones where many humans perish while seeking to enter the United States, 
aim not only to save lives but to convey the message that all lives—including those 
of unauthorized migrants—are worth saving, or, in the event aid comes too late, 
honoring.  
To be sure, doctrine in this area is complex, and the fact that humanitarian aid in 
this context may be covered by the First Amendment does not necessarily mean the 
government cannot regulate it. At issue are laws that incidentally burden speech, and 
the border is not a traditional public forum.17 Even so, whether the regulations at 
issue would survive intermediate scrutiny review is a closer question than one might 
initially surmise.18 Furthermore, the circumstances of the government’s application 
of the regulations to NMD at least raise the possibility of speaker- or viewpoint-based 
discrimination, which would significantly heighten the government’s burden of 
justification.19 While this Article cannot map the full contours of the right to engage 
in expressive humanitarian activity in the borderlands, the analysis makes clear that 
the First Amendment has a role to play and that, accordingly, government actors—
including federal land managers implementing permit schemes, U.S. attorneys 
considering criminal charges, and judges overseeing such prosecutions—should give 
weight to the relevant speech concerns. 
All of this has implications for democracy too, and perhaps especially so in this 
particular moment of U.S. history.20 Beyond its close examination of the 
constitutional subdoctrines implicated by this particular conflict between 
humanitarian activists and government officials in the borderlands, this Article 
 
 
despite overlapping political objections); Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 684 (9th Cir. 
1981) (explaining that “a coincidence of religious and secular claims in no way extinguishes 
the weight appropriately accorded” and any “area of overlap is presumably protected”). 
 15. In Section III.A, infra, I discuss the message test as set out in Spence v. Washington, 
418 U.S. 405 (1974), and modified by Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual 
Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995), but explain why the message test is both over- and 
under-inclusive of free speech coverage. 
 16. See infra Section III.A (discussing the Supreme Court’s guideposts regarding 
expressive conduct in general and, in particular, benchmarks drawn from a recent Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals decision striking down as a violation of free speech an ordinance 
prohibiting the sharing of food with homeless persons in a public park). 
 17. See infra Section III.B.1. 
 18. See infra Section III.B.1. 
 19. See infra Section III.B.2. 
 20. See infra Part IV. 
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makes several broader contributions. First, it offers a full-throated defense of 
expressive conduct at a time marked by widespread government suppression of 
dissenting voices. In so doing, this Article illustrates the First Amendment’s 
important role in protecting and facilitating diverse (and even disruptive) political 
speech,21 as well as its discursive relationship with “the needs of social order and 
human liberty in the context of a changing world.”22  
In particular, the Article advances the claim that NMD’s work has a debate-
generative component that will become increasingly important as border-fortification 
policies force migrants into ever-more dangerous land- and water-crossing points. 
NMD’s symbolic conduct asks us to consider whether humanitarian aid should be a 
crime or whether, instead, we need a right to rescue.23 The activists’ life-saving and 
life-respecting dissent thus aligns with the kind of core political speech that lies at 
the heart of classical First Amendment theory. 
There is, of course, some risk inherent in any push for outward expansion of First 
Amendment coverage. Skeptics might worry that arguments protecting humanitarian 
dissenters in the border regions from government punishment would necessarily 
require constitutional scrutiny for any value-driven conduct, including conduct that 
is socially destructive. Others might connect any speech-category-expansion analysis 
to the current movement to weaponize the First Amendment as an agent of 
deregulation, particularly in areas involving commercial speech.24 Part of the 
skepticism stems from the “disarray” of the Supreme Court’s analysis for First 
Amendment coverage; the elements of the speech tests it has employed cannot alone 
fully explain why some conduct warrants constitutional scrutiny while other conduct 
does not.25 Limiting principles, however, can be derived from doctrine and theory. 
While free-speech-run-amok criticism of deregulatory applications of the Free 
Speech Clause should be taken seriously, the argument advanced here follows a 
different path.26 NMD’s core conduct comprises nonviolent political protest that 
furthers democratic engagement with matters of growing public importance, and it 
does so without infringing on protected spheres of autonomy or liberty held by 
 
 
 21. See GREGORY P. MAGARIAN, MANAGED SPEECH: THE ROBERTS COURT’S FIRST 
AMENDMENT 239–252 (2016); TIMOTHY ZICK, THE DYNAMIC FREE SPEECH CLAUSE: FREE 
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 241 (2018). 
 22. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 57 (2004). 
 23. See infra Section IV.B. 
 24. See generally Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 
116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915 (2016); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 
176–82 (explaining the deregulatory potential of the First Amendment) [hereinafter Shanor, 
The New Lochner]. Scholars such as Professors Shanor and Kessler are generally concerned 
about the potential of that movement to frustrate “the ability of the political branches to act in 
general, and to engage in welfare-enhancing, pre-distributional economic regulation in 
particular.” Amanda Shanor, First Amendment Coverage, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 318, 331 (2018) 
[hereinafter Shanor, First Amendment Coverage]. 
 25. Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1249 
(1995); see also Frederick Schauer, On the Distinction Between Speech and Action, 65 EMORY 
L.J. 427, 427 (2015) (“[I]s the First Amendment’s necessary distinction between speech and 
action fundamentally unsustainable?”). 
 26. See infra Section III.C. 
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others.27 Thus, the group’s challenged activity lies at the heart of the First 
Amendment.  
A robust conception of speech—one that includes communicative, nonviolent 
dissent—facilitates and protects conversations that we as a society need to have right 
now about polarizing subjects like the fair treatment of migrants who risk everything 
to find their way to our shores, as well as those who have lived among us for decades 
without lawful status. Expressive, dissenting conduct of the kind analyzed here 
broadens the democratic knowledge of everyday Americans who might otherwise 
remain unaware of the deadly consequences of these particular U.S. enforcement 
policies, thereby propelling a counternarrative that furthers more informed and 
discerning engagement with immigration policy. Commitment to an effective border 
policy, for example, does not mean that we cannot also be committed to an ethical 
border. And one component of an ethical border might well include a right to save 
other human beings in grave distress without fear of criminal prosecution.  
The Article unfolds as follows. Part I provides the backdrop for NMD’s 
expressive activities, explaining how the U.S. government employs a siege narrative 
and dehumanizing rhetoric to entrench obscuring the deaths far from public view. 
Part II then turns to NMD and other activist groups that express dissent through 
humanitarian efforts in the border areas, as well as the government’s aggressive 
measures to suppress them. Part III then unpacks the First Amendment subdoctrines 
at issue, advancing the argument that much of NMD’s work, in this singular context, 
should be considered speech triggering constitutional scrutiny. While the fact that 
these are generally applicable laws complicates the analysis, the activists have a 
colorable claim that their speech rights are being violated, especially if they can 
establish speaker or viewpoint discrimination. This Part also addresses a set of 
overlapping concerns regarding the drawbacks of a speech-expansionist approach 
and outlines the principles that help distinguish symbolic humanitarian activism from 
expansionist arguments in other contexts, particularly those that involve commercial 
speech. Finally, Part IV widens the scope to consider the implications of NMD’s 
work for democratic knowledge and public debate around border issues, including 
the criminalization of humanitarian aid. 
I. U.S. BORDER POLICY AND THE RHETORIC THAT SUSTAINS IT 
Donald Trump transformed anxiety over the southern border of the United States 
into the keystone of his successful campaign for president. Tapping into currents of 
both nationalism and vulnerability—and, at times, appealing even to bald racism—
Trump stoked crowds into frenzied chants to “Build that Wall!” Throughout the 
Trump administration’s term, the intense focus on immigration retrenchment never 
waned. President Trump’s agenda included visa bans directed at countries with 
 
 
 27. See infra Sections III.C & IV.A. 
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significant Muslim populations,28 family separation policies,29 indiscriminate 
deportations,30 administrative barriers to legal immigration,31 and construction of a 
southern border wall.32 The asserted justification for each measure has been the need 
to regain control of security and national identity through the construction of legal 
and physical barriers to entry. 
Anti-immigrant speech is regularly marshalled to support these initiatives. 
President Trump has referred to noncitizens arriving at the border as “Mexican 
 
 
 28. See Avidan Y. Cover, Quieting the Court: Lessons from The Muslim-Ban Case, 23 J. 
GENDER, RACE & JUST. 1 (2020); Jill E. Family, The Executive Power of Political Emergency: 
The Travel Ban, 87 UMKC L. REV. 611 (2019); see also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 
2399–400 (2018) (upholding a 2017 Presidential proclamation limiting the entry of 
noncitizens from certain Muslim-majority countries); Improving Enhanced Vetting 
Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists 
or Other Public-Safety Threats, 85 Fed. Reg. 6699 (Feb. 5, 2020) (renewing and expanding 
the Trump administration’s 2017 entry ban). 
 29. See Julia Jacobs, U.S. Says It Could Take 2 Years to Identify up to Thousands of 
Separated Immigrant Families, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04 
/06/us/family-separation-trump-administration.html [https://perma.cc/T7NN-JG55]. 
 30. See Jason A. Cade, Sanctuaries as Equitable Delegation in an Era of Mass 
Immigration Enforcement, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 433, 435 (2018) (“Across the United States, 
immigration enforcement in 2017 took a sharp turn in a less nuanced and more draconian 
direction.”). 
 31. See RAISE Act, S. 1720, 115th Cong. (2017); Anya van Wagtendonk, A 
Controversial Deal Between US and Guatemala Could Reshape the Asylum Process, VOX 
(July 27, 2019, 1:37 PM), https://www.vox.com/2019/7/27/8932786/guatemala-us-third-safe 
-country-deal-immigration-asylum-process [https://perma.cc/RVH4-N5L8] (discussing a 
policy requiring Central American migrants who pass through Guatemala to first apply for 
asylum protection in that country); Yeganeh Torbati & Kristina Cooke, Denials of U.S. 
Immigrant Visas Skyrocket After Little-Heralded Rule Change, REUTERS (Apr. 15, 2019, 6:04 
AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-visas-insight/denials-of-u-s 
-immigrant-visas-skyrocket-after-little-heralded-rule-change-idUSKCN1RR0UX 
[https://perma.cc/WK2U-HEFR]. See generally Ming H. Chen & Zachary New, Silence and 
the Second Wall, 28 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 549 (2019) (discussing the creation of various 
administrative barriers to immigration); Nina Rabin, Searching for Humanitarian Discretion 
in Immigration Enforcement: Reflections on a Year as an Immigration Attorney in the Trump 
Era, 53 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 139 (2019) (discussing the Trump administration’s approach 
to the implementation of immigration procedures). 
 32. Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, Remarks on the National Security 
and Humanitarian Crisis on our Southern Border (Feb. 15, 2019), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-national 
-security-humanitarian-crisis-southern-border/ [https://perma.cc/566A-EHPB]. 
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rapists,”33 “stone cold criminals,”34 “[d]ruggies, drug dealers, rapists and killers,”35 
“infestations,”36 carriers of “disease,”37 “terrorists,”38 “animals,”39 and Mexico’s 
“worst people.”40 The Boston Globe reported that over the course of less than one 
year Trump employed “invasion,” or some variant, in this context at least thirty-three 
times.41 
Although much of the Trump administration’s anti-immigrant agenda lies to the 
political right of average Americans,42 the focus on the border as a site for motivating 
outrage and generating support for restrictive measures is neither new nor limited to 
a single political party. The current wave of anti-immigrant backlash started to crest 
 
 
 33. Janell Ross, From Mexican Rapists to Bad Hombres, the Trump Campaign in Two 
Moments, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2016, 12:31 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the 
-fix/wp/2016/10/20/from-mexican-rapists-to-bad-hombres-the-trump-campaign-in-two 
-moments/ [https://perma.cc/EY5N-QDG8]. 
 34. Bart Jansen & Alan Gomez, President Trump Calls Caravan Immigrants ‘Stone Cold 
Criminals.’ Here’s What We Know., USA TODAY (Dec. 6, 2018, 2:00 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/11/26/president-trump-migrant-caravan 
-criminals/2112846002/ [https://perma.cc/926N-VH5P]. 
 35. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 19, 2015, 10:22 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/612083064945180672?lang=en [https://perma.cc 
/7ZGU-DPJN].  
 36. Veronica Stracqualursi, Trump Re-Ups ‘Infestation’ Rhetoric in Immigration Debate, 
CNN (July 3, 2018, 10:58 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/03/politics/trump-ms13 
-illegal-immigration-rhetoric/index.html [https://perma.cc/R34K-BQDD]. 
 37. Hunter Walker, Donald Trump Just Released an Epic Statement Raging About 
Mexican Immigrants and ‘Disease,’ BUS. INSIDER (July 6, 2015, 4:47 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/donald-trumps-epic-statement-on-mexico-2015-7 
[https://perma.cc/ES45-VPMU]. 
 38. Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, Remarks After Meeting with 
Congressional Leadership on Border Security (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov 
/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-meeting-congressional-leadership-border-
security/ [https://perma.cc/6ZTF-PWJ3] (“You know, I talk about human traffickers. I talk 
about drugs. I talk about gangs. But a lot of people don’t say—we have terrorists coming 
through the southern border because they find that’s probably the easiest place to come 
through. They drive right in and they make a left.”). 
 39. Trump: Immigrant Gangs ‘Animals, Not People,’ BBC (May 17, 2018, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-44148697 [https://perma.cc/RMA7-G6PG]. 
 40. Rupert Neate, Donald Trump Announces US Presidential Run with Eccentric Speech, 
GUARDIAN (June 16, 2015, 1:08 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/16 
/donald-trump-announces-run-president [https://perma.cc/9QTL-5JQX]. 
 41. Zoe Greenberg & Christina Prignano, Despite Condemnation of Hate, Trump Has 




 42. The Pew Research Center, for example, reported in August 2019 that 72% of 
Americans believe undocumented immigrants should be allowed to stay in the United States 
legally if certain conditions are met. Public’s Priorities for U.S. Asylum Policy: More Judges 
for Cases, Safe Conditions for Migrants, PEW RSCH. CTR.: U.S. POL. & POL’Y (Aug. 12, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/08/12/publics-priorities-for-u-s-asylum-policy-
more-judges-for-cases-safe-conditions-for-migrants/ [https://perma.cc/2ATQ-J3WL]. 
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in the early 1990s, with government officials along the political spectrum trading on 
fears of an out-of-control border long before President Trump took office.43 
Indeed, “prevention through deterrence,” the official credo of reigning border 
enforcement strategy, now dates back twenty-five years.44 The federal government 
strategically pumped massive resources into manpower, fencing, and surveillance 
measures at the most prevalent entry points, forcing unauthorized migrants into more 
treacherous areas removed from the general public view.45 The increased difficulty 
and expense of crossing, however, did not ultimately deter migrants from making the 
attempt.46 Although diverted, migrants have continued to attempt to cross the border 
despite the elevated peril and cost. 
Although exact numbers are hard to ascertain, more than seven thousand migrants 
have lost their lives in these desert stretches since 2000.47 As Mary Fan recognized 
more than a decade ago, “The raised cost that the strategy levied for unauthorized 
migration turned out to be denominated in life. . . . Soaring death rates and unabated 
migrant traffic showed that people were paying the ultimate price rather than being 
deterred.”48 Thousands of adults, families, and children seeking a better future have 
instead perished by drowning, dehydration, or exhaustion as they surrender to the 
desert’s relentless climate. 
At the same time, border apprehensions in recent years fell well under the historic 
highs of two decades ago. Moreover, recent arrivals tend to consist of families or 
unaccompanied children presenting themselves to border officials at the first 
opportunity in hopes of receiving asylum.49 But neither rising borderland death rates 
 
 
 43. See PETER ANDREAS, BORDER GAMES: POLICING THE U.S.-MEXICO DIVIDE 13 (2d. ed. 
2000) (“Once the border became the primary stage on which the government’s moral resolve 
to combat illegal immigration would be tested, politicians from across the political spectrum 
scrambled to outdo one another in proposing tougher measures to secure the border.”). 
Andreas explains how border officers were instrumental in the initial construction of border 
invasion imagery by intentionally squeezing would-be migrants into a narrow channel, 
through which smugglers organized “Bonzai runs” of fifty migrants at a time. Id. at 87–88 
(“Not only did Border Patrol produce the original video footage used in the Wilson campaign; 
it helped to create the spectacle of an overrun port of entry in the first place.”). 
 44. U.S. BORDER PATROL, BORDER PATROL STRATEGIC PLAN 1994 AND BEYOND: 
NATIONAL STRATEGY (1994). 
 45. See ROBERT LEE MARIL, THE FENCE: NATIONAL SECURITY, PUBLIC SAFETY, AND 
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION ALONG THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER 284–86 (2003). 
 46. See ANDREAS, supra note 43, at 107 (“Even though the INS insisted that ‘prompt 
apprehension and return to country of origin is a positive deterrent to illegal reentry and related 
violations,’ the evidence suggests that migrants simply kept trying to cross until they 
eventually succeeded.”).  
 47. Ryan Devereaux, Bodies in the Borderlands, INTERCEPT (May 4, 2019, 8:00 AM), 
https://theintercept.com/2019/05/04/no-more-deaths-scott-warren-migrants-border-arizona/ 
[https://perma.cc/24VM-GNE3]. 
 48. Mary D. Fan, When Deterrence and Death Mitigation Fall Short: Fantasy and 
Fetishes as Gap-Fillers in Border Regulation, 42 L. & SOC’Y REV. 701, 702–03 (2008); see 
also Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Why a Wall?, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 147, 155 (2012) (“[T]he 
cost of the border fence cannot be measured in currency alone.”). 
 49. DORIS MEISSNER & JULIA GELATT, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., EIGHT KEY U.S. 
IMMIGRATION POLICY ISSUES: STATE OF PLAY AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 5–6 (2019). 
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nor the changing demographics of the migrant families who arrive at the border have 
precipitated efforts at meaningful policy reform. Instead, government officials 
continue to double down on exploitation of public anxiety about an uncontrolled 
border because doing so serves a number of instrumental goals. 
First, the invocation of a country under siege helps generate and justify large fiscal 
appropriations. Congress has allotted more support to the immigration enforcement 
agencies than to any federal law enforcement agency.50 CBP takes the lion’s share of 
this allocation, to the tune of $16.3 billion in fiscal year 2018 for border security 
efforts.51 The second function the siege rhetoric serves is to validate harsh, ostensibly 
defensive measures. Leo Chavez has described a “Latino Threat Narrative,” in which 
noncitizen migrants from Latin America become “part of an invading force from 
south of the border” that threatens to “destroy[] the American way of life.”52 Family 
separation and detention, enhanced militarization, and wall construction are more 
easily accepted when the government is positioned as a savior guarding American 
citizens against foreign invaders.  
This project is an easier sell if the general public remains unaware that many 
human beings are dying inside the United States when—partly as result of official 
policy, and partly due to their own desperation—they seek safety or work through 
perilous border crossings. The “goal is to render invisible the innumerable 
consequences this sociopolitical phenomenon has for the lives and bodies of 
undocumented people.”53 The basis of this goal is simple: many citizens might grow 
to view border policies in a different light if they knew more about the human costs, 
and citizen outrage can be a critical component of the process of policy change. 
While some observers might argue that migrants assume the risk when they attempt 
unlawful entry, others believe that the circumstances these migrants flee (for 
example, violence or environmental catastrophe) or the conditions that pull them here 
(for example, family members, personal safety, or available jobs) justify more 
accommodating immigration policies. From the government’s perspective, however, 
this challenging policy debate might be avoided if the deaths of those who perish 
seeking safety or work are hidden from public view.  
Siege narratives (and tough border policies) also express something to the 
noncitizens seeking entry. The message to migrants is that their lives are expendable 
in the interest of border security, national integrity, or other concerns. To this end, 
the desert is weaponized, marshalled to express the power the state exercises over 
migrant bodies.54 Anthropologists argue that leaving bodies to decay in the desert 
 
 
 50. Id. at 3. Congress allocated $24 billion in fiscal year 2018 to CBP, Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, and the Office of Biometric and Identity Management, an amount that 
totals 34% more than appropriations for all other federal criminal law enforcement agencies 
combined. The Trump administration has signaled that it is seeking more than $8 billion for 
border wall construction for fiscal year 2020. Id.  
 51. Id. at 4. 
 52. LEO R. CHAVEZ, THE LATINO THREAT: CONSTRUCTING IMMIGRANTS, CITIZENS, AND 
THE NATION 3 (2d ed. 2008). 
 53. JASON DE LEÓN, THE LAND OF OPEN GRAVES: LIVING AND DYING ON THE MIGRANT 
TRAIL 4 (2015). 
 54. Randall H. McGuire & Ruth M. Van Dyke, Crossing la Linea: Bodily Encounters 
with the U.S.-México Border in Ambos Nogales, in THE BORDER AND ITS BODIES: THE 
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sends a message, marking migrants as undeserving of the care and respect usually 
afforded the dead.55 “[W]hat the deployment of the desert as a weapon actually 
accomplishes is not to prevent or deter undocumented border crossings, but rather to 
make such crossings more terrifying and more destructive to migrants than ever 
before.”56  
In summary, the government employs anti-immigrant and often dehumanizing 
narratives to marshal political and financial support for costly and cruel border 
measures while skillfully hiding the human harms that result. But as the next Part 
discusses, other actors are engaged in a project of contestation and reconstruction of 
narratives around the border regions and the fates of migrants. Increasingly, dissenter 
groups also strive to influence the public’s awareness of and opinion about these 
challenging issues, expressing a starkly different set of messages. 
II. “A MISGUIDED SENSE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE”57: GOVERNMENT SUPPRESSION OF 
HUMANITARIAN ACTIVISM AND DISSENT 
The U.S. government has been largely successful in hiding the human costs of 
migration policy over the last two decades by funneling migrants into remote deserts. 
Nevertheless, residents and humanitarian workers along the border, and particularly 
in Arizona, have long been upset by the deaths occurring so close to their 
communities. Secular and faith-based humanitarian groups have coalesced in the 
region, many of which try to provide aid to distressed migrants.58  
This Part first summarizes some of these humanitarian activities, focusing on 
NMD in particular, and then turns to the government’s increasingly aggressive 
measures to suppress or punish that activity. 
 
 
EMBODIMENT OF RISK ALONG THE U.S.-MÉXICO LINE 41, 58 (Thomas E. Sheridan & Randall 
H. McGuire eds., 2019).  
 55. Robin Reineke, Necroviolence and Postmortem Care Along the U.S.-México Border, 
in THE BORDER AND ITS BODIES: THE EMBODIMENT OF RISK ALONG THE U.S.-MÉXICO LINE, at 
144, 150 (arguing that leaving the dead uncared for marks them and others from their 
communities as “threatening outsiders” and “subhuman”); see also infra notes 144–46 and 
accompanying text (discussing the expressive significance of honoring or failing to honor the 
dead). 
 56. Reineke, supra note 55, at 148. 
 57. Henry Brean, Not Guilty: Jurors Acquit Border Aid Volunteer Scott Warren on 
Harboring Charges, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (July 7, 2020), https://tucson.com/news/local/not 
-guilty-jurors-acquit-border-aid-volunteer-scott-warren-on-harboring-charges/article 
_f5100171-c1ee-58d2-84b8-9ab85e98ecea.html [https://perma.cc/9LR5-Q3TC]. 
 58. For a concise description of three such faith-based border groups, see Kristina M. 
Campbell, Humanitarian Aid is Never a Crime? The Politics of Immigration Enforcement and 
the Provision of Sanctuary, 63 SYRACUSE L. REV. 71, 107–11 (2012). Notably, Tucson was 
the birthplace of the 1980s Sanctuary movement, a faith-based network that provided legal 
screening and basic assistance to Central American refugees whose asylum claims were not 
receiving fair consideration by government officials. Barbara Bezdek, Religious Outlaws: 
Narratives of Legality and the Politics of Citizen Interpretation, 62 TENN. L. REV. 899, 928–
31 (1995). The humanitarian border groups operating in the area today consist of both the 
original activists from that movement and a new generation of concerned community 
members. 
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A. Humanitarian Dissent in the Borderlands 
Humanitarian activists on the southern border believe that individual human 
beings should not forfeit their lives simply because they seek safety, family 
reunification, or employment through irregular migration. Building on a long history 
of American abolitionists and civil rights advocates, those who engage in this work 
feel that to ignore or accommodate U.S. immigration policies that result in 
unnecessary suffering or death is tantamount to condoning them.  
NMD arose as part of this movement. Founded in March 2004 at the Multi-Faith 
Border Conference, the organization’s stated mission is “to end death and suffering 
in the Mexico-US borderlands through civil initiative: people of conscience working 
openly and in community to uphold fundamental human rights.”59 With members 
willing (and physically able) to undertake arduous treks into the stifling Sonoran 
Desert, the group gradually has increased public awareness about the fatal 
consequences of enforcement policies. 
NMD is distinguished from many similar humanitarian groups by the expressive 
messaging that underscores its work. NMD provides humanitarian aid not solely to 
save lives, but also to communicate. One of its central messages is the belief that 
citizens have “the right to provide humanitarian assistance” to migrants in distress.60 
The organization has adopted and published “Faith-Based Principles for Immigration 
Reform,” which urge the government to adopt more humane policies: “These tragic 
and unnecessary deaths must stop. The border blockade strategy has militarized the 
US-Mexico border, which drives migrants into remote desert regions yet has failed 
to stem the flow of immigrants into the United States.”61  
Like those of the government, NMD’s border activities are undertaken in support 
of both instrumental and expressive goals.62 The organization’s website, newsletters, 
and policy statements frequently proclaim the symbolism of the activities in which it 
engages. The group’s publications emphasize themes of public dissent and collective 
resistance, through the provision of humanitarian aid, to the border enforcement 
policies that put migrant lives in danger.63 As the next Section describes, the threat 
 
 
 59. About No More Deaths, supra note 4. No More Deaths is an official ministry of the 
Unitarian Universalist Church of Tucson. No More Deaths, UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST SERV. 
COMM., https://www.uusc.org/initiatives/no-more-deaths/ [https://perma.cc/L6FQ-FDNK]. 
 60. About No More Deaths, supra note 4 (emphasis in original). Among NMD’s explicit 
tenets and goals, as listed on its website, are the following: “Witnessing and responding,” 
“Consciousness raising,” “Global movement building,” and “Encouraging humane 
immigration policy.” Id. 
 61. Faith-Based Principles for Immigration Reform, NO MORE DEATHS, 
https://nomoredeaths.org/about-no-more-deaths/faith-based-principles-for-immigration 
-reform/ [https://perma.cc/VF48-XG4N]. 
 62. Indeed, the group’s acts of compassion in this area acquire symbolic significance in 
part because of the contrast with the “powerful and dominant forces of violence and erasure 
they contest.” Reineke, supra note 55, at 151. See also Shalini Bhargava Ray, Saving Lives, 
58 B.C. L. REV. 1225, 1264 (2017) (arguing that acts of humanitarian aid embody and promote 
freedoms of expression and association). 
 63. The group’s many public statements evincing desire to shift cultural understandings 
of migrants’ plight and the role of the government in perpetuating death in the desert include 
the following: (1) “Until the deaths in the desert end, No More Deaths/No Mas Muertes 
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that NMD’s dissenting activity poses to the status quo was not lost on the Trump 
administration. 
B. Government Suppression of Borderland Dissenters 
NMD’s activities have long positioned the organization in an antagonistic 
relationship with CBP and other federal officials.64 In recent years, these conflicts 
have reached a boiling point. The Trump administration escalated measures that aim 
to suppress NMD’s activities, including through criminal prosecutions.  
1. The Permit Scheme and Blacklist 
In 2017, federal land managers in the border regions coordinated a plan with other 
federal agencies to target humanitarian activities directly.65 The gist was to change 
the permitting rules such that any visitors onto Cabeza Prieta (which contains the Ajo 
desert corridor now regularly traversed by unauthorized migrants) would first be 
required to acknowledge that it was unlawful to “abandon . . . personal property” in 
that area.66 Pointedly, a subregulatory policy provision was added to the permitting 
requirements, which defined water containers, food, blankets, and medical supplies 
as “personal property” subject to the abandonment prohibition.67 
 
 
volunteers will walk the migrant trails and give aid to those we meet and those we never see,” 
Catherine Gaffney, Volunteers Triple Desert Area Where They Offer Life-Saving Aid, NO 
MORE DEATHS, (No More Deaths, Tuscon, Ariz.), Dec. 2015, at 2, https://nomoredeaths.org 
/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Dec-2015-NMD-newsletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/72YA 
-KKB3]; (2) “The light that must continue to shine is active nonviolent resistance to an 
increasingly oppressive border policy that imperils and terrorizes millions of migrants and 
immigrants,” Dear Friends of No More Deaths, NO MORE DEATHS (No More Deaths, Tuscon, 
Ariz.), Apr. 2017, at 1, https://nomoredeaths.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Newsletter 
-2017spring-v3a-eng-export.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3CL-AUVB]; (3) “It is the duty of 
humanitarian aid groups to publicly . . . expose the Border Patrol policies that cause the deaths 
and disappearances of migrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico border,” Alicia Dinsmore, Why Do 
People Disappear in the Desert?, NO MORE DEATHS, (No More Deaths, Tuscon, Ariz.), Apr. 
2016, at 1, https://nomoredeaths.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/NMD-Spring-2016 
-Newsletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/24WB-JMFK]. 
 64. As the organization characterizes it, federal policy has led land managers “away from 
productive collaboration with humanitarian aid groups and toward a racist national 
administration that puts pressure on all government agencies to uphold a white supremacist 
agenda.” NO MORE DEATHS, supra note 1. 
 65. Devereaux, supra note 8.  
 66. See 50 C.F.R. § 26.22(b) (2020) (requiring a permit for entry); 50 C.F.R. § 27.93 
(2020) (prohibiting abandoning certain property); 50 C.F.R. § 35.5 (2020) (prohibiting driving 
in a wilderness area without authorization). 
 67. United States v. Hoffman, 436 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1278 (D. Ariz. 2020) (“The month 
before Defendants entered the CPNWR without a permit, the permit application was amended 
to specifically prohibit the leaving of ‘water bottles, water containers, food, food items, food 
containers, blankets, clothing, footwear, [and] medical supplies’ . . . .”); Devereaux, supra 
note 47; Devereaux, supra note 8. 
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The official’s private communications (obtained through discovery in later court 
proceedings) suggested that the permitting policy was amended in this fashion not to 
combat environmental damage to a fragile ecosystem, but rather to address internal 
frustration that humanitarian activists’ aid efforts “can help energize folks to hike 
another day or two,” and “thus continue their journey.”68 At least one federal official 
began to deny permits preemptively to anyone suspected of being affiliated with the 
organization. Sidney Sloane, a manager of the Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife 
Refuge, testified in the criminal prosecution of some of the activists that he had “a 
number of ways” to conclude that a permit-seeker was working with NMD.69 Any 
person triggering Sloane’s suspicions was placed on an issue-no-permit blacklist, 
which was routinely shared with other federal managers. No evidence has yet 
emerged to suggest that any individuals other than suspected NMD volunteers were 
preemptively banned from the refuge.70 
2. Arrests and Prosecutions 
In the early days of the Trump administration, then-Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions flew to Ambos Nogales, Arizona, where he warned that federal prosecutors 
would prioritize criminal proceedings against anyone providing aid to unauthorized 
noncitizens.71 Some humanitarian workers in the area believed the threat was 
directed specifically at them.72 Nevertheless, many carried on, continuing to register 
opposition to border policies through the provision of life-saving aid. 
The administration followed through on its threat, prosecuting 4500 persons in 
fiscal year 2018 and 5700 persons in fiscal year 2019 for crimes related to helping 
noncitizens along the border, including through the provision of humanitarian aid.73 
Overall, such prosecutions increased by more than 30% from 2015 to 2019.74 NMD 
activists are among those who have been arrested and prosecuted. Most of these 
charges have involved misdemeanor offenses concerning access and use 
restrictions—in particular, the “abandonment” of personal property regulations. 
 
 
 68. Devereaux, supra note 8. For further discussion of the government’s asserted interests 
in suppressing NMD’s speech rights, see infra Section III.B.1. 
 69. Devereaux, supra note 8. Although one federal official reminded Sloane that it was 
unlawful to preemptively ban individuals from the permitting process, Sloane was apparently 
undeterred. Id. 
 70. Devereaux, supra note 47. On this point, it bears observing that to overcome the 
activists’ religious freedom defense strategy prosecutors would have had some incentive to 
illustrate instances of preemptive permit denials to persons other than suspected NMD 
volunteers, if such instances existed and could be documented. 
 71. See Jefferson B. Sessions III, Att’y Gen. of the U.S., Memorandum for Federal 
Prosecutors Along the Southwest Border (Apr. 6, 2018). 
 72. See Devereaux, supra note 47. 
 73. Lorne Matalon, Extending ‘Zero Tolerance’ to People Who Help Migrants Along the 
Border, NPR (May 28, 2019, 4:22 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/28/725716169 
/extending-zero-tolerance-to-people-who-help-migrants-along-the-border [https://perma.cc 
/25BU-B5Y4]; Along the US-Mexico Border Prosecutions for Harboring Immigrants 
Continue to Climb, TRAC (Apr. 13, 2020), https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/603/ 
[https://perma.cc/YQJ7-YX8N].  
 74. Matalon, supra note 73. 
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When humanitarian aid is provided in a more temporally direct fashion involving 
face-to-face settings, however, it appears prosecutors will pursue felony charges 
under a theory of harboring unauthorized migrants or facilitating their unlawful 
entry.75 The recent felony prosecutions of Scott Warren exemplify this approach.76 
Generally speaking, the NMD defendants have tended to admit the underlying 
humanitarian conduct while asserting the protection of RFRA as a defense.77 As 
participants in an official ministry of the Unitarian Universalist Church of Tucson, 
NMD’s members attest that their faith compels them to assist other human beings in 
distress. The defendants argued that the permit rules and the prosecutions 
substantially burdened their sincerely held religious beliefs without a compelling 
justification.78 Magistrate Judge Velasco, who was overseeing the recent trials of the 
misdemeanor-only defendants, concluded that the RFRA did not support dismissal 
of any of the charges. Four defendants agreed to pay hefty civil fines in exchange for 
dismissal of the criminal charges by prosecutors.79 Judge Velasco found the other 
four guilty on all the misdemeanor counts. On February 3, 2020, however, U.S. 
District Court Judge Marquez reversed the convictions pursuant to application of 
RFRA.80  
As for Scott Warren, the government’s first felony prosecution on the harboring 
charges against him went to trial in May 2019. Ultimately, the jury was unable to 
reach a verdict on any of the felony counts, resulting in a mistrial.81 Federal 
 
 
 75. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324; Along the US-Mexico Border Prosecutions for Harboring 
Immigrants Continue to Climb, supra note 73. 
 76. Paul Ingram, Scott Warren to Be Retried on 2 Migrant Harboring Charges, TUCSON 
SENTINEL (July 2, 2019, 12:02 PM), http://www.tucsonsentinel.com/local/report/070219_scott 
_warren_retrial/scott-warren-retried-2-migrant-harboring-charges/ [https://perma.cc/F5P3-
9X4N].  
 77. See, e.g., Devereaux, supra note 8 (noting that the defendants argued they “were 
acting on deeply held principles to confront a ‘crisis of the soul’ that has turned much of 
southern Arizona’s most remote federal lands into a ‘veritable cemetery’”).  
 78. United States v. Hoffman, 436 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1277 (D. Ariz. 2020); see also Brief 
of and by Professors of Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant’s Motion 
to Dismiss, United States v. Warren, No. CR-18-00223-001-TUC-RCC, 2018 WL 4403753 
(D. Ariz. June 21, 2018). 
79. Nicole Ludden, Federal Charges Against Four No More Deaths Volunteers Are 
Dropped, CRONKITE NEWS (Feb. 21, 2019), https://cronkitenews.azpbs.org/2019/02/21/no-
more-deaths-charges-dropped/ [https://perma.cc/T95W-9DWU]. Pursuant to a plea agreement 
with prosecutors, the defendants pled guilty to a civil infraction instead, paying fines of $250 
each. See Government’s Motion to Dismiss Information with Prejudice, United States v. 
Deighan, No. MJ-17-0340-TUC-BPV, 2018 WL 6809429 (D. Ariz. Mar. 4, 2019).  
 80. Hoffman, 436 F. Supp. 3d at 1273.  
 81. Matt Shuman, Mistrial for Border Volunteer Charged with Felonies for Aiding 
Migrants, TALKING POINTS MEMO (June 12, 2019, 12:22 PM), 
https://talkingpointsmemo.com/news/scott-warren-no-more-deaths-mistrial [https://perma.cc 
/6SEU-NSBG]; Ryan Devereaux, Felony Trial of No More Deaths Volunteer Scott Warren 
Ends in Mistrial, INTERCEPT (June 12, 2019, 8:13 AM), https://theintercept.com/2019/06/12 
/felony-trial-of-no-more-deaths-volunteer-scott-warren-ends-in-mistrial/ [https://perma.cc 
/KM3D-KJTW] (reporting that eight of the twelve jurors believed Warren was innocent on all 
counts). 
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prosecutors retried Warren on two of the counts in November 2019. This second bite 
at the apple resulted in Warren’s full acquittal.82 In a separate bench trial on the 
misdemeanor charges, U.S. District Court Judge Collins found Warren guilty of 
unauthorized operation of a motor vehicle on federal lands but acquitted him of the 
federal littering charge pursuant to RFRA.83  
Following Warren’s acquittal in the second trial, the U.S. Attorney for Arizona 
publicly stated that his office would continue to prosecute aggressively those who 
provide aid to migrants even if “they’re doing it out of what I would say (is a) 
misguided sense of social justice.”84 In Section IV.B I will return to the significance 
of Warren’s acquittal and the federal prosecutors’ aggressive stance. For now, the 
key point is that the government clearly intends to continue to suppress, punish, and 
chill expressive humanitarian activity, necessitating engagement with any limits 
required by the First Amendment.  
III. BORDERLAND HUMANITARIANISM AS EXPRESSIVE SPEECH 
The previous sections of this Article described NMD’s humanitarian work in 
Arizona borderlands as a response to the official rhetoric and policies that contribute 
to and attempt to justify migrant deaths in the desert, as well as the government’s 
suppression of that dissenting conduct. In this Part, I turn to the constitutional 
concerns raised by that analysis. Specifically, because certain key components of the 
activists’ humanitarian work are intended to have a communicative and symbolic 
function in addition to a utilitarian purpose, and would be reasonably understood as 
such in the relevant context, government attempts to suppress or punish that work 
trigger application of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.85  
In the sections that follow, I first focus my attention on the threshold 
determination: namely, why at least some of NMD’s humanitarian activities should 
be classified as “speech.” I argue that because key parts of their work constitute 
expressive conduct covered by the First Amendment, the ensuing analytic steps 
involve assessing the nature of the burden on the particular activity at issue and the 
appropriate level of scrutiny.  
A. Expressive Conduct and the First Amendment 
The Supreme Court has long held that “the Constitution looks beyond written or  
 
 
 82. Brean, supra note 57. 
 83. District Judge’s Minutes in the United States District Court District of Arizona – 
Tucson, United States v. Warren, No. 17-00341MJ-001-TUC-RCC (D. Ariz. Nov. 20, 2019). 
 84. Brean, supra note 57. 
 85. On the distinction between First Amendment coverage and protection, see generally 
Mark Tushnet, Art and the First Amendment, 35 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 169, 174–75 (2012) 
(“First Amendment analysis conventionally distinguishes between the question of whether 
some activity is covered by the First Amendment and the question of whether that activity, if 
covered, is protected by the First Amendment.”) (emphasis in original); Frederick Schauer, 
Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 270–71 
(1981) (discussing the distinction between First Amendment coverage and protection).  
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spoken words as mediums of expression.”86 Symbolic action, no less than pure 
speech, is capable of profound communication—“a short cut from mind to mind,” as 
the Court once memorably described it.87 The autonomy and self-determination 
values protected by the First Amendment, Robert Post observed, “extend[] not 
merely to the speech of persons but also to the actions of persons.”88 Symbolic 
conduct has also been recognized to communicate support for or dissent from 
government orthodoxy or policies,89 and thus it furthers other central First 
Amendment values such as formation of democratic knowledge90 and protection of 
outsider voices.91 As a general matter, the doctrinal development over time has 
trended toward expanding the categories of speech covered by the First 
Amendment.92 Over the years, the Court has found a variety of expressive conduct 
to warrant constitutional coverage, including wearing black arm bands,93 cross 
burning,94 flag burning,95 parading,96 and much more.97 One of the Court’s more 
 
 
 86. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).  
 87. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1942). See generally Louis 
Henkin, Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 79 (1968) (emphasis in original) 
(“Speech is conduct, and actions speak. There is nothing intrinsically sacred about wagging 
the tongue or wielding a pen; there is nothing intrinsically more sacred about words than other 
symbols.”). 
 88. Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 479 
(2011).  
 89. See, e.g., Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634, 643 (recognizing that saluting the American flag 
communicates a message of support for government orthodoxy, and accordingly, cannot be 
constitutionally compelled consistent with the speech protections of the First Amendment); 
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974) (per curiam) (recognizing that defendant’s 
act of affixing a peace symbol to an American flag hung upside down, in violation of a state 
statute, constituted “a pointed expression of anguish by appellant about the then-current 
domestic and foreign affairs of his government”). 
 90. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); 
see also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (“[D]ebate on public issues 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open . . . .”).  
 91. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304. U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See generally 
Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985) (unpacking the 
efficacy of Carolene Products’s commitment to participatory democracy); JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (considering interpretivist 
approaches to judicial review designed to protect against the tyranny of the majority).  
 92. See generally ZICK, supra note 21, at 115–16. 
 93. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969) (finding 
that wearing black armbands under the circumstances was akin to “pure speech,” which is 
entitled to First Amendment protections). 
 94. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347–48 (2003). 
 95. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989). 
 96. See Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977). 
 97. See Hudnut v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 475 U.S. 1001, 1001 (1986) (affirming lower 
court’s decision that pornography is constitutionally protected expression), aff’g 771 F.2d 323 
(7th Cir. 1985); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (finding 
that a tent city set up in a park across from the White House is symbolic speech within the 
ambit of the First Amendment); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (holding that 
contributions to political candidates or entities is a form of political speech); Schacht v. United 
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famous symbolic speech cases concerned David O’Brien, who in 1966 publicly 
burned his draft registration card outside a federal court house.98 O’Brien’s symbolic 
act was understood in the context to communicate protest of American involvement 
in the Vietnam War.99 
To be sure, not all conduct is sufficiently expressive to trigger First Amendment 
coverage. The Court’s case law in this area is often read holistically to set out a 
message test with two elements.100 First, the actor must intend the action to convey 
a message.101 Second, a reasonable observer must be able to interpret the activity as 
conveying some sort of message.102 For conduct to be sufficiently expressive to 
warrant First Amendment scrutiny, however, the observer need not “infer a specific 
message.”103 As the Supreme Court has opined, “[A] narrow, succinctly articulable 
message is not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined to 
expressions conveying a ‘particularized message,’ would never reach the 
unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, 
or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.”104 
Theorists have long lamented the inadequacy of the Court’s coverage elements to 
explain which speech or speech acts get First Amendment coverage.105 Some 
communicative acts that would plainly satisfy the message test are held to be outside 
 
 
States, 398 U.S. 58, 62–63 (1970) (holding that wearing a military uniform without 
authorization in anti-war theatrical production is constitutionally protected expression); 
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968) (holding that the First Amendment 
covers not just pure speech but also “expressive conduct,” including burning one’s draft card 
as a form of protest). 
 98. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 369–70. 
 99. Id. at 370. 
 100. See, e.g., James M. McGoldrick, Jr., Symbolic Speech: A Message from Mind to Mind, 
61 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 36 (2008) (discussing “the imbued test” and “the message test” as various 
iterations of the Court’s methodology for determining whether conduct falls within the First 
Amendment). 
 101. Id.; see also Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974) (per curiam) (noting 
that the defendant’s act of affixing a peace symbol to an American flag hung upside down, in 
violation of a state statute, was “not an act of mindless nihilism,” but instead constituted “a 
pointed expression of anguish by appellant about the then-current domestic and foreign affairs 
of his government”). Although Spence has not been overruled, the Court later made clear that 
“a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection” for 
expressive conduct. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 
569 (1995). 
 102. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568; see also Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 
1252, 1270 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that a student’s decision to raise his fist silently instead 
of reciting the Pledge of Allegiance constitutes expressive conduct within the First 
Amendment). 
 103. Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1270; see also id. (“Even if students were not aware of the 
specific message Holloman was attempting to convey, his fist clearly expressed a generalized 
message of disagreement or protest directed toward Allred, the school, or the country in 
general.”). 
 104. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569 (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 411).  
 105. See Schauer, supra note 25, at 427 (arguing that the Court’s distinctions between 
speech and action for purposes of First Amendment doctrine are “unsustainable”); Post, supra 
note 25, at 1250–60. 
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the scope of the First Amendment,106 while other conduct is “unquestionably 
shielded”107 despite the possibility that no message is actually intended or reasonably 
understood. In reality, most courts assess whether expressive content warrants First 
Amendment coverage by engaging carefully with the characteristics of the activity 
in question and the particular context in which the activity occurred.108 Amanda 
Shanor provides a helpful account of the kinds of social contexts that tend to lead 
courts to conclude particular conduct falls within the scope of the Free Speech 
Clause.109 As she explains, “The case law suggests that First Amendment coverage 
rests on the cohesiveness of the expected social meaning of, and reaction to, the 
activity in question—including how a speaker will affect the behavior of or harm a 
listener or audience.”110 On one end of the spectrum is political speech (or in some 
circumstances, political conduct). Political speech falls within the core of the First 
Amendment because its audience is likely to consist of people who have divergent 
views and will accordingly interpret and react to that speech in divergent (and often 
unpredictable) ways.111 In contrast, other social contexts consist of more cohesive 
communicative norms, such that particular expressive acts will be “generally 
understood in the interpretive community to have a given effect.”112 Speech or 
conduct falling within this latter sort of context, even if expressive, is likely to be 
unprotected by the Constitution when the unified audience generally agrees that the 
given speech effect is harmful. Shanor’s account helps explain why courts exclude 
fraud, workplace sexual harassment, incitement, and other plainly communicative 
acts from First Amendment coverage.113 
It is this kind of judicial engagement with social context that helps establish 
whether something like mere presence in a particular place takes on expressive 
significance.114 While the act of sitting typically lacks expression, a “sit-in” to protest 
a segregated library conveys meaning115 even though the audience will not be unified 
 
 
 106. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (cataloging 
excluded categories of speech from First Amendment protection, including “the lewd and 
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words”); United States v. 
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010) (noting that unprotected categories of speech include 
“obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct”). 
 107. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569; Tushnet, supra note 85, at 174–75.  
 108. See, e.g., McGoldrick, supra note 100, at 31–76 (surveying Supreme Court and lower 
court applications of various tests to categorize speech, all of which involve deliberation about 
the context around the particular conduct at issue); Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City 
of Fort Lauderdale, 901 F.3d 1235, 1240–42 (11th Cir. 2018) (illustrating this approach). 
 109. Shanor, First Amendment Coverage, supra note 24.  
 110. Id. at 344. 
 111. See id. at 351. 
 112. Id. at 354. 
 113. See id. at 346–54. 
 114. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 26 (1992) (arguing that 
group demonstrations “are perhaps the single most vital forms of expression in human 
experience”); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 292–98 (1970) 
(“The presence of people in the street or other open public place for the purpose of expression, 
even in large numbers, would also be deemed part of the ‘expression.’”). 
 115. See Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 901 F.3d 1235, 1241 
(11th Cir. 2018) (“Context also differentiates the act of sitting down—ordinarily not 
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about what is meant or what to do about it. Similarly, “[c]ontext separates the 
physical act[] of walking from the expressive conduct associated with a picket line 
or a parade.”116 In a parade, those who march are “making some sort of collective 
point, not just to each other but to bystanders along the way.”117 And social context 
explains why nude dancing may receive constitutional coverage even if nudity itself 
is not inherently expressive.118  
Can sharing water with distressed migrants in the desert or honoring the remains 
of those who have perished in its harsh climate also qualify as forms of expressive 
messaging within the meaning of the First Amendment? The ensuing discussion 
answers that question affirmatively after deep engagement with these relevant 
contextual factors: (1) the tremendous public concern, particularly in the region, 
about the consequences of unauthorized migration in the borderlands; (2) the 
historical symbolism of sharing sustenance with those in need and of respecting the 
remains of those who have died; (3) the expressive—and expressively contested—
significance of the place where the citizen dissenters carry out their humanitarian 
activities; and (4) the sharing of these activities and experiences with wider 
audiences through videos, reports, newsletters, media articles, and other first-hand 
accounts, along with direct messaging, such as through inscriptions or symbols left 
on water jugs distributed in the desert refuges, to government agents and migrants 
themselves about the right to provide humanitarian aid. Taken in combination, these 
considerations suggest that some humanitarian conduct in this unusual context is 
sufficiently communicative to merit First Amendment scrutiny of government 
attempts to suppress or punish it. 
Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale, an opinion issued 
by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in 2018, helps establish the contours of 
each factor.119 In that case, the court relied on the Free Speech Clause to find that a 
government ordinance that prohibited a nonprofit from sharing food at no cost with 
homeless persons in a public park was unconstitutional.120 The Eleventh Circuit 
panel determined that the relevant social context placed the activities of Fort 
Lauderdale Food Not Bombs (FLFNB) on the expressive side of the line for First 
Amendment purposes, unanimously concluding that the organization engaged in 
“peaceful . . . direct action” that warranted constitutional protection when distributing 
food to the homeless in a public park in downtown Fort Lauderdale.121  
 
 
expressive—from the sit-in by African Americans at a Louisiana library which was understood 
as a protest against segregation.”).  
 116. Id. 
 117. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 568 (1995). 
 118. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565–66 (1991) (plurality opinion); 
see also City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (plurality opinion) (“As we 
explained in Barnes, . . . nude dancing of the type at issue here is expressive conduct, although 
we think that it falls only within the outer ambit of the First Amendment's protection.”). 
 119. Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs, 901 F.3d 1235. 
 120. Id. at 1238. 
 121. Id. 
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1. Public Interest 
The intensity of public interest in the matter that a particular symbolic activity 
concerns (or reacts to) often comprises an important factor in determining its 
communicative nature. In late-twentieth-century cases—for example, Tinker, 
Spence, and O’Brien—the symbolic activity at issue concerned American military 
involvement in Southeast Asia, a matter of significant public concern at the time.122 
Similarly, in Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs, the Eleventh Circuit found that the 
organization’s food-sharing activities were related to “an issue of concern in the 
community”—namely, “the treatment of the City’s homeless population.”123 Elected 
officials previously had held a public workshop to address concerns about 
homelessness.124 The local news had covered the city’s homeless population.125 This 
local discussion, the court opined, “provides background for FLFNB’s events,” and 
thereby “adds to the likelihood that the reasonable observer would understand that 
FLFNB’s food sharing sought to convey some message.”126 
The consequences of border policies are analogous issues of intense concern for 
local communities in southern Arizona and elsewhere along the U.S.-Mexico 
border.127 Increasingly, residents throughout the United States pay attention to, and 
debate, their government’s approach at the southern border and the fate of the 
migrants who wish to enter the country.128 Borderland activities of various sorts, 
undertaken by both government and private actors, have long been points of 
contention, debate, and news coverage.129 The idea of the border wall itself is highly 
contentious, representing moral resolve and sovereignty to some, and a socially and 
 
 
 122. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 503 (1969) 
(concerning wearing black armbands to protest U.S. policy in Vietnam); Spence v. 
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 405 (1974) (concerning a party that displayed his flag upside down 
as a protest against recent actions in Cambodia); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 367 
(1968) (concerning a party that burned his draft card in an effort to influence others to adopt 
his antiwar beliefs). 
 123. Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs, 901 F.3d at 1242. The relevant public concern in 
Clark also centered on homelessness and income equality; see also Clark v. Cmty. for Creative 
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 288 (1984) (recognizing that a tent city can be communicative 
in the right context). 
 124. Id. at 1242. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs, 901 F.3d at 1242–43. 
 127. See, e.g., Bob Ortega, For an Arizona Border Community, Life Under Trump Means 
Risks, Limbo and Delays, CNN (Apr. 15, 2019, 10:58 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/15/us/nogales-border-uncertainty-under-trump-invs/index 
.html [https://perma.cc/LMX8-8TGX]. 
 128. See, e.g., Jessica Kutz, At a Protest in Arizona, Border Communities Are Fighting 
Trump’s Wall, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 24, 2019), 
https://www.motherjones.com/environment/2019/11/at-a-protest-in-arizona-border 
-communities-are-fighting-trumps-wall/ [https://perma.cc/9SNP-QHM9]. 
 129. See, e.g., Andrea Aguilar, Comment, Civilian Border Patrols: The Right to Safely 
Cross the Border vs. the Right to Protect Private Property, 11 SCHOLAR 371, 378 (2009) 
(discussing “civilian border patrol groups” in the 1990s). 
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environmentally destructive waste of resources to others. As discussed previously,130 
the government’s official prevention-through-deterrence strategy has been costly in 
terms of resources expended, the loss of human life, and the rising consternation felt 
by local residents in border communities. All of this context provides the backdrop 
that contributes the communicative significance of NMD’s humanitarian work. 
2. Historical Symbolism 
A second contextual factor—the historical symbolism of the act in question—also 
influences assessment of a symbolic activity’s communicative nature. For example, 
black armbands worn by students in 1965 communicated despair and compassion for 
the loss of lives in Vietnam precisely because the wearing of black armbands has for 
hundreds of years symbolized mourning in western culture.131 And as the court in 
Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs observed, “[I]t matters that FLFNB uses the 
sharing of food as the means for conveying its message, for the history of a particular 
symbol or type of conduct is instructive in determining whether the reasonable 
observer may infer some message when viewing it.”132 The court continued, “[T]he 
significance of sharing meals with others dates back millennia. The Bible recounts 
that Jesus shared meals with tax collectors and sinners to demonstrate that they were 
not outcasts in his eyes. In 1621, Pilgrims and Native Americans celebrated the 
harvest by sharing the First Thanksgiving in Plymouth.”133  
The historical importance of sharing sustenance—especially with those that many 
in society would deem to be outcasts or undesirables—thus adds to the 
contextualization of NMD’s conduct as expressive activity. Without a doubt, water 
can be expressive and symbolic. In the Bible, water often communicates salvation.134 
 
 
 130. See supra Section I. 
 131. See The History of Black Armbands, CLASSROOM (Sept. 7, 2018), 
https://classroom.synonym.com/the-history-of-black-armbands-12081726.html 
[https://perma.cc/K629-NUFY]. To be sure, the Court in Tinker devoted little space to 
discussing the nature of the armbands as symbolic activity, no doubt because its 
communicative aspect was well-enough understood at that point in history. See Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 516 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) (“Here the 
constitutional right to ‘political expression’ asserted was a right to wear black armbands during 
school hours and at classes in order to demonstrate to the other students that the petitioners 
were mourning because of the death of United States soldiers in Vietnam and to protest that 
war which they were against.”). 
 132. Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs, 901 F.3d at 1243 (citing Monroe v. State Court of 
Fulton Cty., 739 F.2d 568, 571 n.3 (11th Cir. 1984)). 
 133. Id. (citations omitted). 
 134. See Isaiah 8:6 (King James) (“Forasmuch as this people refuseth the waters of Shiloah 
that go softly, and rejoice in Rezin and Remaliah's son[.]”); see also Isaiah 12:3 (King James) 
(“Therefore with joy shall ye draw water out of the wells of salvation.”); Revelation 21:6 (King 
James) (“And he said unto me, It is done. I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end. 
I will give unto him that is athirst of the fountain of the water of life freely.”); Revelation at 
22:1 (King James) (“And he shewed me a pure river of water of life, clear as crystal, 
proceeding out of the throne of God and of the Lamb.”). 
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For those who are baptized, water symbolically confers new life.135 Indeed, water 
and means of its dispersal have likely had expressive components for millennia. 
NMD’s water sharing in the desert invokes this transformative imagery. Water 
jugs do not merely save lives but also symbolize the sanctity of life. The activists 
provide aid not solely as a means of rescue but also to make the collective points that 
all lives are worth saving and that, as fellow humans, our society has both an 
obligation and a right to help those less fortunate regardless of legal constructs like 
immigration status. In one of NMD’s videos, which shows CBP destroying water 
containers and other supplies left by volunteers in the desert, an activist writes 
“Water is Life” on a replacement jug.136 Other activists write “vaya con Dios” or 
draw crucifixes on bottles of water.137 In this context, sharing water thus becomes 
symbolic of cultural traditions and norms like generosity, empathy, and 
opportunity.138  
While the giver and receiver of the water in these circumstances are often 
temporally separated, the delay in transmission does not by itself defeat the symbolic 
significance.139 When I mail a campaign contribution check to my preferred political 
candidate—for example, rather than handing over cash in person or executing an 
electronic transfer of funds—the delay between the expression of my support and its 
receipt does not undermine its speechlike qualities. Nor is any symbolic significance 
altered by the lag between the production of a film and its movie-theater or home-
streaming audience, or by my decision to bury an engagement ring in a cupcake for 
my would-be fiancée to discover alone at a later time. 
Additionally, the undeniable functionality of water for thirsty migrants does not 
obviate the expressiveness in this context.140 Many expressive and communicative 
activities also have utility of some sort. For example, when Muslims take part in Hajj 
(the five-day pilgrimage to Mecca), they do so both to physically reach an important 
destination and to take part in a shared journey that itself conveys deep historical 
symbolism.141 Taking communion is no less meaningful if the sacrament happens to 
 
 
 135. See J. C. COOPER, AN ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF TRADITIONAL SYMBOLS 18 
(1987). 
 136. No More Deaths, Border Patrol Harassment and Vandalism, YOUTUBE (Jan. 16, 
2013), https://youtu.be/8MmOWHHCav4 [https://perma.cc/QNG8-KLTB].  
 137. See, e.g., United States v. Hoffman, 436 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1283 (D. Ariz. 2020). 
 138. The symbolism of water at the border is also reflected in the physical memorial 
created by the family of two migrants who died of thirst in 2019 while attempting to cross the 
desert. A relative of the deceased explained that “[t]he water is for my sister and my nephew 
. . . . That they never lack for a drink again.” McDonnell, supra note 3; see also id. (“Here in 
Guatemala, relatives have set up flower-bedecked memorials at their homes, displaying 
candles, photos and other mementos. A glass of water sits on each altar, emblematic of the 
victims’ forlorn efforts to quench a life-sapping thirst.”). 
 139. Moreover, the government has chilled activists’ ability to engage in more direct 
sharing of water by pursuing felony charges against those who do so under harboring or 
facilitating theories. See supra Section II.B.2 (discussing the impact of arrests on activists’ 
ability to locate migration routes and distribute water directly).  
 140. But cf. Peter Meijes Tiersma, Nonverbal Communication and the Freedom of 
“Speech”, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1525, 1567 (arguing that nonfunctionality is one of a number of 
hallmarks of symbolic speech).  
 141. See Jennifer Williams, Hajj, the Islamic Pilgrimage to Mecca, Explained for Non-
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quench the parishioner’s hunger or thirst, just as a sit-in at a lunch counter can both 
communicate protest of a segregated space and provide the opportunity to order a 
sandwich. Nude dancing, whether on a ballet stage or in an adult club, serves as a 
vehicle for the performer’s expression even while it facilitates the audience 
members’ entertainment.142 Campaign contributions have significant utility, but that 
fact does not undo their expression of the intensity of a political donor’s support for 
a candidate or cause. 
In addition to sharing water, one of NMD’s central borderland activities—and one 
that also has historical and cultural significance—concerns discovering and honoring 
the dead. The details of this kind of conduct, as reported by Ryan Devereaux, help 
illustrate its deep symbolic import: 
Warren has a checklist he goes through every time he finds a body in the desert. 
The earthly components are straightforward. Log the GPS coordinates. Take 
photographs and notes. Scour the brush for more bones. . . . But for Warren, the 
process doesn’t end there.  
Warren believes that these moments merit an acknowledgement of humanity. And 
so, after years of recoveries, the 36-year-old has developed a modest ritual for the 
grim encounters. He goes quiet, lowers himself to the earth, collects the dirt around 
him, and then lets the soil pour through his fingers. The point, Warren says, is to take 
a moment to reflect or, as he puts it, “hold space.”143 
Other NMD activists have described the solemn and ritualistic moments that they 
too perform when encountering migrant deaths.144 These rituals transcend the 
physical, instrumental acts of walking in the desert, setting out water jugs, and 
mapping the locations of the deceased. When confronted by the deathly 
consequences of border policies, the ceremonial conduct that the activists engage in 
has communicative properties. Moreover, if contemporaneously observed by or 
subsequently relayed to others, these are acts that “speak.” They communicate to 
other activists, to the perpetrators and enablers of the policies that contribute to 
migrant deaths, to families of the deceased, and to any listener (including those who 
learn of their acts through media accounts, court documents, or law review articles), 
and they may well do so more effectively than words alone. The rituals they perform 
express the deepest of feelings, no less than well-recognized religious or civil 
ceremonies of mourning. They express grief and a sense of loss over the deceased, 
no less than the flying of a flag at half-mast.  
 
 
Muslims, VOX (Aug. 20, 2018, 12:50 PM), https://www.vox.com/2016/9/12/12814258/hajj 
-2018-islamic-pilgrimage-mecca-what-is-explained [https://perma.cc/6GJF-P43Z]. 
 142. Cf. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 594 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) 
(“[W]hile the entertainment afforded by a nude ballet at Lincoln Center to those who can pay 
the price may differ vastly in content (as viewed by judges) or in quality (as viewed by critics), 
it may not differ in substance from the dance viewed by the person who . . . wants some 
‘entertainment’ with his beer or shot of rye.” (quoting Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 501 F.2d 18, 
21 n.3 (2d Cir. 1974))). 
 143. Devereaux, supra note 47.  
 144. See, e.g., United States v. Hoffman, 436 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1281–82 (D. Ariz. 2020) 
(recounting testimony from four NMD volunteers about ritualistic activities to honor the 
remains of migrants discovered in the desert). 
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A not-to-be-overlooked, contextual aspect of this compassionate treatment of the 
dead by the humanitarian dissenters is the stark contrast it poses to the message 
conveyed by the state’s neglect of those same migrant bodies. Mistreatment of the 
deceased—including neglect for their remains—is a recognized form of violence, 
especially when perpetrated on a large scale.145 In every modern society—and 
certainly in the United States—the remains of human beings typically are accorded 
far more respect than the remains of animals. Specifically, care is taken to discover 
and identify human remains, as well as to provide for their culturally appropriate 
commemoration and disposal. Thus, when the U.S. government widely disregards 
those cultural norms in the borderlands, especially when coupled with policies that 
intentionally funnel migrants to locations where death is likely, it is reasonable to 
understand the message communicated to be one of disrespect for the value of 
migrant bodies. Some observers interpret the result of these actions and nonactions 
as a kind of intentional violence.146 And as Jason De León has noted, this particular 
brand of violence is “easily outsourced to animals, nature, or technology.”147 Thus, 
attempts to discover, honor, and recover the remains of the deceased migrants that 
state policy leaves neglected can express dissent and attempt to shift public opinion 
about migrants and the policies that affect them.  
In sum, the historical and symbolic nature of sharing sustenance with outsiders 
and of ceremonially recognizing and honoring the deceased also helps establish the 
message-bearing quality of NMD’s humanitarian activities.  
3. Location 
The location in which the conduct occurs can be relevant to the constitutional 
analysis of its communicative qualities. O’Brien burned his draft card in front of a 
public courthouse, helping to contextualize the nature of his protest against 
government policy.148 Nude dancing takes on expressive qualities in part because it 
occurs in performance spaces.149 While a mock tent city set up in the capital’s 
Lafayette Park dramatizes concern about income inequality,150 pitching the same 
tents in a random stretch of woods likely would fail to do so.  
 
 
 145. See Tadesse Simie Metekia, Violence Against and Using the Dead: Ethiopia’s Dergue 
Cases, 4 HUM. REMAINS & VIOLENCE 76 (2018); Sidi N’Diaye, Neighbour Murders in Rwanda 
and Poland: What Mutilated Bodies and Killing Methods Tell Us About Historical 
Imaginaries and Imaginaries of Hatred, 2 HUM. REMAINS & VIOLENCE 3 (2016); Reineke, 
supra note 55, at 150–55.  
 146. Moreover, because disrespect to the dead is itself a kind of symbolic message, it can 
lead to more violence and social unrest when seen by others. See DE LEÓN, supra note 53 
(discussing the state in which bodies can be found in the border areas and the messages these 
deteriorating remains can convey). 
 147. Id. at 71. 
 148. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 369–70 (1968). 
 149. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565–66 (1991) (plurality opinion); 
see also City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (plurality opinion) (“As we 
explained in Barnes, however, nude dancing of the type at issue here is expressive conduct . . 
. .”).  
 150. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 291–92 (1984). 
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Accordingly, in Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs, the Eleventh Circuit also 
focused on the symbolic relevance of the park where FLFNB wished to conduct its 
food-sharing activities.151 To be sure, government-owned parks tend to be considered 
public forums for First Amendment purposes and therefore presumptive havens for 
expressive activity.152 Importantly, however, the Eleventh Circuit did not rest its 
analysis on that fact alone. Rather, the court found it especially significant that the 
site FLFNB chose for its expressive activity was “known in the community as a 
location where the homeless tend to congregate” and was a longstanding place of 
“battleground over the City’s attempts to reduce the visibility of homelessness.”153  
Although the desert preserves where NMD undertakes its conduct are government 
owned and presumptively allow for public access through a permitting scheme, they 
would not be deemed traditional public forums. Nevertheless, the particularity of a 
place matters to the content and impact of speakers’ expression.154 The place in which 
speech or speech acts occur “profoundly impacts expressive message, persuasive 
efficacy, participation, and symbolic meaning.”155 The borderlands are “content-
correlated”156—that is, the particular attributes of the desert region where migrants 
are channeled comprise critical aspects of the expression occurring there. “Places are 
not given but made,” as Timothy Zick has explained.157 Rules, norms, and social 
processes transform the “raw material of undifferentiated space” into an expressive 
place.158 By engaging in humanizing acts of compassion in the same terrain that 
federal officials have weaponized against migrants, NMD’s activities engage in a 
contest over the place’s expressive meaning itself. 
The contested expressive content of the borderlands underscores the importance 
of the location factor in imbuing the activists’ work with expressive meaning. Those 
in society holding power, such as government officials, tend to exercise control over 
the appropriate uses of a space, thereby significantly constraining if not outright 
directing its expressive content. Government officials construct places to reify their 
power and justify their preferences. In this way, “place manifests power,” which can 
then be used to suppress agitators or particular viewpoints that threaten the status 
quo.159 NMD seeks to transform the government’s messaging about unauthorized 
migration in desert regions through the creation of new practices and memories. 
 
 
 151. See Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 901 F.3d 1235, 1242 
(11th Cir. 2018) (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409–10 (1974)) (noting that 
“[a]lthough the choice of location alone is not dispositive, it is nevertheless an important factor 
in the ‘factual context and environment’” to be considered). 
 152. See Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The 
protections afforded by the First Amendment are nowhere stronger than in streets and parks . 
. . .”). 
 153. Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs, 901 F.3d at 1238. 
 154. See Timothy Zick, Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topography, 74 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 439, 439 (2006). 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV. 581, 588, 638–39 
(2006). 
 157. Id. at 621. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 623. 
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Thus, the expressive nature of NMD’s activity comes into sharper relief when one 
considers the location in which it occurs.  
4. Audiences 
The fourth and final contextual factor to highlight here concerns the audiences 
reached by the expressive activities and associated messaging. Had O’Brien simply 
tossed his draft card in the fireplace while alone at home, the Court would have been 
hard-pressed to find sufficient communicative elements. At the same time, though, a 
single viewer, even at some remove, may be sufficient to establish the necessary 
communicative link.160 If this hypothetical home-alone O’Brien had been able to film 
the conflagrating registration card in his fireplace and then upload it to the not-yet-
invented internet, his message might eventually have reached a great number of 
viewers. And, in such a situation, neither the total number of observers nor the lack 
of immediacy between act and observation would deplete its ultimate communicative 
aspect.161 Rather, the important facts would be that O’Brien intended the act to be 
visible to at least some portion of the public, and that an audience to understand some 
meaning behind it was eventually found.  
Turning once again to the Eleventh Circuit case, the court there noted that 
FLFNB’s events are not closed: anyone present can partake in sharing meals 
together.162 The organization also sets up tables and banners.163 The visibility of 
FLFNB’s activities, such that others might witness and reflect on their import in the 
context of government policies that affect the homeless, contributed to the court’s 
conclusion that “FLFNB’s food sharing events are more than a picnic in the park.”164 
While NMD’s parallel humanitarian work occurs in far more isolated locations, 
much of it takes place in the open on presumptively accessible government lands. 
Though remote, the dissenters’ activities are visible to each other, federal agents, 
migrants, and any others present in the area. The college students who participate in 
NMD’s popular alternative spring break program, for example, are well positioned 
to ascertain the symbolism of these humanitarian efforts. As one of NMD’s 
newsletters reports, “[S]tudents come to understand, especially now as anti-
immigrant/migrant sentiment permeates our society, how important it is to 
participate in justice work and to stand in solidarity with people who are victimized 
by our oppressive and deadly institutional practices.”165 
 
 
 160. See, e.g., Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1270 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that a student’s silently raised fist to a single administrator constituted sufficiently 
communicative speech within the First Amendment); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 
406 (1974) (per curiam) (noting that occasional passersby might see the protestor’s modified 
flag). 
 161. See supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text. 
 162. See Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 901 F.3d 1235, 1242 
(11th Cir. 2018).  
 163. Cf. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 
570 (1995) (explaining that parades can constitute constitutionally protected conduct in part 
because participants “distributed a fact sheet describing the members’ intentions”). 
 164. Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs, 901 F.3d at 1243.  
 165. Dear Friends of No More Deaths, NO MORE DEATHS (No More Deaths, Tucson, 
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Border Patrol agents and other government officials are another intended audience 
for communicative conduct expressing NMD’s beliefs about human dignity and 
survival, a point driven home by some of the inscriptions scrawled on the jugs, which 
directly underscore the implied message that “Water is life” and that those who 
intentionally destroy the water vessels are responsible for the ensuing deaths.166 As 
for the desert-crossing migrants (and perhaps their friends and families who may hear 
their stories later), the activists’ humanitarian work may communicate the idea that 
not all citizens of the United States see their lives as expendable. 
Finally, through publication of their videos, reports, and newsletters, as well as 
through media attention on their conduct and the government’s responses to it, the 
activists’ expression disseminates to a wider public, including other citizens 
throughout the United States. These various means of transmission to a variety of 
audiences increase public awareness of the consequences of border policy for 
migrants as well as the work of activists who express opposition to those policies in 
the desert regions where migrants are channeled. In like fashion to FLFNB’s 
activities as understood by the Eleventh Circuit, NMD’s work is undertaken with an 
eye toward galvanizing public attention on the issues that it cares about. The 
expressive content of sharing water in this context is emphasized yet further when 
the group employs water jug inscriptions to “speak” directly to the perpetrators of 
policies and actions that the group opposes and then shares that “speech” in a publicly 
accessible video with multiple audiences.  
Of course, all these different audiences will have divergent interpretations and 
reactions to the group’s messages. But that sort of variance serves to reinforce its 
core political nature and the need for constitutional scrutiny of government attempts 
to repress or punish it. 
* * * 
Evaluating all the contextual factors present in Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs, 
the Eleventh Circuit determined that FLFNB’s food sharing conveyed a political 
message, rather than solely constituting an act of charity.167 Specifically, the court 
concluded that the organization’s work promotes alternative ideas about poverty and 
the need for humanitarian distribution of resources. Consequently, the City’s 
application of an ordinance to restrict their food-sharing activities violated the 
Constitution. 
This closely related precedent, along with the guideposts set forth by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, strongly supports the conclusion that NMD’s humanitarian work in 
this unique context constitutes the kind of expressive activity that should be covered 
by the First Amendment. The expression of concern, community, and conscience that 
 
 
Ariz.) April 2016, at 2, https://nomoredeaths.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/NMD-Spring 
-2016-Newsletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2PT-QETN] (discussing alternative spring break 
program). 
 166. See supra text accompanying notes 136–37; Border Patrol Harassment and 
Vandalism, supra note 136, at time stamp 6:31 (showing a water jug inscribed with the words, 
“To those who would destroy these gallons: Water is Life! You are a murderer. How do you 
sleep at night?”). 
 167. See Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs, 901 F.3d at 1238. 
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NMD intends to convey through the act of sharing water in the desert challenges 
complacency about militarized border policy and toleration of its consequences. 
Through their acts of kindness, defiance, and risk, the activists in NMD hope to 
generate thought and debate among U.S. citizens more broadly. In no less elemental 
a way than O’Brien’s decision to use the destructive power of fire to convey the depth 
of his protest against U.S. military operations overseas, NMD summons the life-
giving symbolism of water to express the depth of its compassion for fellow humans 
in distress.168 
In short, NMD can satisfy the Court’s message test. The activists intend for their 
work to express concern and care for the lives of migrants, no less than other humans, 
and opposition to the federal immigration policies that have created what they view 
as a humanitarian crisis in the southern border regions. Observers would reasonably 
infer in this context that some message lies behind the group’s conduct.169 At bottom, 
careful engagement with the relevant contextual circumstances indicates that 
providing water to distressed migrants and honoring the remains of those who do not 
survive are sufficiently communicative activities to fall within the ambit of the First 
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. 
B. Generally Applicable Laws 
Because, as I have argued, NMD’s humanitarian activity is expressive conduct 
covered by the First Amendment, the government’s attempts to restrain or punish it 
demand constitutional analysis. Freedom of speech, after all, is a fundamental 
right.170 Accordingly, the legitimacy of the state’s rationale for the restrictions—as 
well as evidence of its actual motivations—must be weighed against the strength of 
the free speech interests at stake.171 At the same time, the laws that burden NMD’s 
speech are “generally applicable,” which complicates the analysis. A generally 
applicable law is one that operates in some circumstances without raising any 
constitutional problems.172 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on generally applicable laws that incidentally 
hamper expression does not present a picture of clarity.173 Over the years, the Court 
 
 
 168. Thanks to Greg Magarian for helping crystalize the elemental comparison. 
 169. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 
569 (1995) (“[A] narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional 
protection . . . .”). 
 170. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).  
 171. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); Timothy Zick, Managing 
Dissent, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1423, 1441–42 (2018). 
 172. Dan T. Coenen, Free Speech and Generally Applicable Laws: A New Doctrinal 
Synthesis, 103 IOWA L. REV. 435, 455 (2018). 
 173. Id. at 438 (characterizing concepts such as “generally applicable laws” as “deeply 
undertheorized and widely misunderstood”); see also Jeffrey M. Shaman, Rules of General 
Applicability, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 419, 423 (2012) (describing Supreme Court 
jurisprudence regarding laws of general applicability as “perplexing”); Srikanth Srinivasan, 
Incidental Restrictions of Speech and the First Amendment: A Motive-Based Rationalization 
of the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 401, 403 (1995) (arguing that 
the Court’s opinions concerning incidental regulation of speech are “conflicting”).  
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has analyzed First Amendment challenges to such laws in confusing and seemingly 
“inconsistent” ways.174 Part of the difficulty stems from the fact that deciding 
whether a law is generally applicable is only the first step. After that threshold inquiry 
is resolved, courts must determine the nature of the law’s burden on speech and the 
appropriate level of scrutiny.  
To simplify the discussion somewhat, here I will focus on two primary 
government restrictions of NMD’s work: (1) the rules and decision-making 
employed to restrict the activists’ access to the desert region, which burdens their 
ability to find and ceremoniously honor the deceased, as well as their ability to 
distribute water; and (2) the permit/regulatory scheme prohibiting “abandonment” of 
water bottles or other aid, which also burdens the activists’ expressive humanitarian 
conduct.175 For the most part, I will bracket for subsequent work the felony harboring 
and facilitation charges that the government employs when an activist’s provision of 
humanitarian aid to unauthorized migrants is more direct.176 The limitations on 
access, like the requirement that park visitors not distribute water, directly collide 
with NMD’s desire to make water available to distressed migrants in remote 
locations and to locate and show respect to the deceased. 
The discussion will track the application of two frameworks, synthesized from the 
Court’s tangled approach to laws of general applicability that burden speech, to each 
of these restrictions. First, I will assume that courts would analyze the government’s 
actions as having only an incidental burden on expressive conduct. This framework 
requires application of an intermediate scrutiny standard, in line with O’Brien.177 
While intermediate scrutiny is obviously much more favorable to the government 
than strict scrutiny, it is not necessarily a death knell for the activists. The 
government’s justifications for its restrictions are arguably weak and the resulting 
burden on speech is considerable. 
The second framework for evaluating free speech challenges to the access and 
abandonment rules will assume that the activists are able to establish the 
government’s discriminatory application of the rules against them. Indeed, the rules 
and their implementation suggest the possibility of speaker or viewpoint bias, given 
extrinsic factors like the timing and nature of the permitting policy revisions, the 
ensuing prosecutorial crackdown, and emerging evidence that NMD activists have 
been singled out for punishment because of their views.178 If a court were to conclude 
 
 
 174. David S. Day, The Incidental Regulation of Free Speech, 42 U. MIA. L. REV. 491, 525 
(1988); see also Srinivasan, supra note 173, at 403 (characterizing the Court’s decisions in 
this area as “conflicting”). 
 175. See 50 C.F.R. § 26.22 (2020) (general exception for entry); 50 C.F.R. § 27.93 (2020) 
(abandonment of property). One of the NMD defendants was also charged with unauthorized 
operation of a motor vehicle, in violation of 50 C.F.R. § 35.5. For simplicity, I will not analyze 
that regulation in this Article, but it is worth noting that the district court judge also overturned 
that conviction on RFRA substantial burden grounds. United States v. Hoffman, 436 F. Supp. 
3d 1272, 1289 (D. Ariz. 2020). 
 176. The discussion will, however, briefly return to the expressive significance of the 
government’s repeated failed attempts to convict Scott Warren on felony harboring charges. 
See infra Part IV. 
 177. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 178. See infra Section III.B.2 (discussing the government’s internal emails expressing 
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that the burdens were imposed because of hostility to particular viewpoints or 
speakers, then more heightened scrutiny would be appropriate, and the regulation of 
speech would be more likely to fail. 
1. Intermediate Scrutiny for Laws that Incidentally Burden Expression  
To begin, it appears likely that the regulations and policies that govern access to 
the desert preserves and put restrictions on “abandoning . . . personal property” 
therein would be categorized as laws of general applicability that incidentally burden 
the activists’ speech.179 In O’Brien, for example, the law at issue generally prohibited 
mutilation of draft cards regardless of motive and therefore was unrelated to the 
content of any particular defendant’s expression.180 While O’Brien himself 
undertook registration destruction with expressive intent, others who triggered 
application of the law did so on the basis of activity that had no underlying 
communicative aspect.  
Similarly, one can reasonably presume that not everyone who wishes to enter 
federally managed borderlands or who decides to violate the conditions of an access 
permit does so for expressive reasons. Thus, the burden on the activists’ speech in 
this case would be viewed as incidental (at least on the face of the applicable 
regulations) and accordingly would be reviewed with intermediate scrutiny.181 
As set forth in O’Brien, courts applying the intermediate scrutiny standard of 
review should find the expression at issue to be protected by the First Amendment 
against the application of a law that only incidentally burdens speech unless: (1) the 
challenged law “is within the constitutional power of the government,” and (2) 
“furthers an important or substantial governmental interest,” which (3) “is unrelated 
to the suppression of free expression,” and so long as (4) “the incidental restriction 
on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of that interest.”182 
To date, few Supreme Court cases have required the Justices to invoke the 
O’Brien standard, and speakers tend to lose free speech claims pitted against 
generally applicable laws. That said, intermediate scrutiny does sometimes result in 
a victory for speakers invoking the First Amendment,183 and, even more importantly, 
 
 
frustration with NMD members’ humanitarian activities in particular, the blacklists used to 
preemptively deny permits to anyone even suspected of being a member of NMD, and the fact 
that other would-be entrants such as researchers are often granted access and exemptions). 
 179. To be sure, the government has argued this position in litigation. See, e.g., 
Government Brief at 11, United States v. Hoffman, 436 F. Supp. 3d 1272 (D. Ariz. 2020) (No. 
4:19-CR-00693) (arguing that the regulations are for “all members of the public, not just 
defendants”). 
 180. Coenen, supra note 172, at 455 (“Instead, the sole harm targeted by the draft-card-
mutilation law had to do with the destruction of physical property that served a useful role in 
the administration of a government program.”). 
 181. See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA & MELVILLE NIMMER, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM 
OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 9:17 (1994). 
 182. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
 183. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 668 (1994) (applying 
O’Brien intermediate scrutiny test to cable “must-carry” rule and remanding for more careful 
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“the Court often has allowed lower federal courts to apply the O’Brien test fairly 
strictly.”184 Thus, while this standard of review is obviously less onerous for the 
government than strict scrutiny, it nevertheless contains enough bite for free speech 
concerns to prevail in certain circumstances. 
The regulations governing access and use of federal preserves undoubtedly are 
within the power of the government to promulgate, satisfying the first factor in 
O’Brien. Thus, turning to the second factor, the inquiry is whether the restrictions 
further an important or substantial governmental interest. In the recent criminal 
prosecutions against the activists, the government has asserted two primary interests: 
(1) protection of a “pristine” ecosystem, and (2) deterrence of unlawful migration. I 
will briefly consider each in turn. 
Courts would likely characterize the protection our nation’s unique federal parks 
and ecosystems, including desert preserves, as an important national interest. A 
question remains, however, whether the regulations and permitting rules at issue here 
actually further that interest. Magistrate Judge Velasco, who oversaw the 
prosecutions against the activists, found that the area in question is “littered with 
unexploded military ordinance, the detritus of illegal entry into the United States, 
and the on-road and off-road vehicular traffic of the U.S. Border Patrol efforts to 
apprehend illegal entrants/undocumented immigrants.”185 Similarly, in its review of 
Judge Velasco’s decision, the district court noted: 
The evidence at trial established that the CPNWR is a former active military 
bombing range that has unexploded munitions strewn about. The Refuge is currently 
both a corridor for unlawful entry into the United States, which produces significant 
amounts of garbage, and also a site of significant law enforcement activity, which 
takes its own environmental toll.186 
Thus, the resolution of this O’Brien element may well depend on the level of 
generality with which a court views the application of the regulation. Even if 
environmental protection of federal preserves constitutes an important goal in a 
generic sense (and it undoubtedly does), the government still may have work to do 
in establishing that these particular regulations, as applied to the particular region 
where these particular speakers desire access, “further” that goal to a more than 
marginal degree.187 Since the preserve is already in poor environmental condition, 
the regulations have slim utility in accomplishing the government’s purpose in 
keeping them pristine.188 If viewed through a wider lens, however, there may be other 
 
 
review); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974) (applying O’Brien intermediate 
scrutiny test to invalidate prison mail restrictions). 
 184. Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. 
REV. 615, 708 n.344 (1991). See generally id. (“O’Brien, on its face, is not [toothless].”); 
Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First 
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 497 n.226 (1996) (observing that intermediate 
scrutiny of generally applicable laws “has the potential to matter”). 
 185. United States v. Hoffman, 436 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1287 (D. Ariz. 2020). 
 186. Id. (citations omitted). 
 187. In O’Brien, for example, the Court found that the draft-card-mutilation ban manifestly 
furthered, in concrete ways, the government’s objectives in administering the proper 
functioning of the Selective Service program. 391 U.S. at 378–81. 
 188. Cf. Hoffman, 436 F. Supp. 3d at 1287 (observing that the “Government . . . has not 
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federal parks in which the regulation more consequentially furthers this asserted 
interest. 
The other interest that the government has asserted in barring NMD’s access—
and then criminally prosecuting them for permit violations—concerns “controlling 
immigration” at the border.189 It is worthwhile, if disheartening, to unpack the steps 
of this argument. In short, the anti-littering regulation (and its enforcement) prevents 
activists from providing potable water to unlawful entrants, which makes it more 
likely the migrants will die. These deaths—especially when the bodies are left to 
deteriorate in the elements as an expressive warning—then may deter others from 
attempting to unlawfully enter, or so the argument goes.  
As one court has noted, “This gruesome logic is profoundly disturbing.”190 One 
would like to think it doubtful that any court applying the intermediate scrutiny 
standard would conclude that punishing peaceful humanitarians through anti-
littering regulations in order to avert their interference with a border enforcement 
strategy of deterrence by death qualifies as an important or substantial government 
interest.191  
In any event, however, the question whether the regulation at issue actually does 
anything to further that asserted interest in immigration control looms even larger 
than with respect to the environmental-protection objective. As discussed earlier, 
deaths in the region already number in the thousands and show no signs of abating.192 
The claim that activists’ sporadic (and symbolic) attempts to save lives will exert any 
meaningful effect on migrants’ decisions to risk entry through that perilous terrain is 
highly speculative. Indeed, the claim is refuted by the available evidence. As the 
district court reviewing the convictions of the NMD defendants noted, “32 sets of 
human remains were recovered from the Refuge in 2017 alone, and the Government 
produced no evidence that these fatalities had any effect in deterring unlawful entry. 
Nor has the Government produced evidence that increasing the death toll would have 
such an effect.”193 
Thus, whether the government can establish that these laws further important or 
substantial government interests presents a closer question than one might initially 
suppose. The principle uncertainty stems from how much import to accord the 
requirement that the generally applicable law actually advances the asserted 
underlying interests. In O’Brien, the Court took pains to explain how the 
government’s prohibition on destruction of draft cards “substantially furthers” its 
 
 
established that providing an exemption to [the No More Deaths] Defendants would frustrate 
that interest” in furthering “the national decision to maintain [the federal land] in its pristine 
nature”). 
 189. Id. at 1288. 
 190. Id. at 1289.  
 191. While national security was held to comprise an important governmental interest in 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010), the Court was careful to explain why 
that interest justified prohibition or prosecution of speech in the unique context of providing 
coordinated advocacy or assistance to officially designated terrorist organizations. Domestic 
littering offenses present a much different and less compelling context within which to assert 
security or immigration control interests. 
 192. See supra Section I. 
 193. Hoffman, 436 F. Supp. 3d at 1289. 
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interest in maintaining an efficient and workable Selective Service System.194 This 
suggests that the government bears some not-inconsequential burden of persuasion 
in establishing that its asserted interests—if recognized as important by a court—are 
also substantially promoted by the law in question. 
The next element of O’Brien’s intermediate scrutiny analysis asks whether the 
purpose of the law being challenged is unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression. There is no reason to suspect that the regulations governing access and 
use of the preserve were promulgated in order to target communication.195 One 
possible wrinkle, though, is that in 2017 federal land managers pointedly revised the 
access-permitting scheme to interpret the regulation’s reference to “personal 
property” as including water bottles, blankets, and similar humanitarian aid items.196 
When this localized interpretive gloss is appended to the regulation at issue, it 
becomes apparent that the government has its sights set on suppressing a particular 
kind of expressive conduct or a particular set of speakers.197 Thus, the resolution of 
this element may well depend on whether the regulation is viewed in isolation or in 
conjunction with the interpretive permitting restriction. 
The final step of intermediate scrutiny requires that the restriction on speech be 
no greater than is essential. The regulations at issue here require activists to obtain 
permits and to abide by the permits’ terms and conditions.198 If they do not, they face 
criminal prosecution. In light of the foregoing discussion explaining why NMD’s 
water-giving and death-honoring activities should be considered speech within the 
meaning of the First Amendment,199 it follows that they cannot exercise that speech 
without violating the regulations as the government currently interprets them. 
Effective communication of NMD’s desired messages appears to necessitate the 
sharing of water and the honoring of migrant deaths in the precise locations where, 
in its view, the objectionable government policies contribute to that selfsame 
suffering and death. The powerful dissent embodied in the activists’ work might lose 
its expressive content if banned from the border regions.200 
To be sure, the access restriction, if considered in isolation, presents a distinct 
question. Because mere entry into the federal park is not itself expressive, one might 
surmise that O’Brien simply does not apply to that aspect of the criminal 
prosecutions. Indeed, the district court judge deciding Scott Warren’s misdemeanor 
bench trial rejected an RFRA defense to his conviction for unauthorized entry on 
analogous reasoning.201  
 
 
 194. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381 (1968) (emphasis added). 
 195. But see infra Section III.B.2 (discussing the potential discriminatory-applied aspect 
of the government’s administration of the permitting scheme). 
 196. See supra Section II.B.1; Hoffman, 436 F. Supp. 3d at n.13. 
 197. And that conduct, of course, already must have been determined by the court to 
qualify as free expression, or the O’Brien test would not apply. 
 198. 50 C.F.R. § 26.22(b) (2019). 
 199. See supra Part III.A. 
 200. See Thomas P. Crocker, Displacing Dissent: The Role of “Place” in First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2587, 2588 (2007) (arguing that “where we speak is often 
just as important as what we say”). See generally Section III.A. 
 201. United States v. Warren, No. 17-00341MJ-001-TUC-RCC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
202146, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. Nov. 20, 2019). But see United States v. Hoffman, 436 F. Supp. 3d 
349094-ILJ 96-1_Text.indd   307 12/17/20   9:49 AMElectronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3592882
296 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 96:261 
 
As it turns out, however, the Supreme Court at least arguably has extended 
O’Brien to a situation similar to this one, in which the “nonspeech” burdened by a 
generally applicable law is “intimately related to expressive conduct protected under 
the First Amendment.”202 The expansion stems from a case called United States v. 
Albertini, which concerned a federal law that made entry onto a military base a crime 
if the defendant had been issued a “bar letter.”203 Albertini had been issued such a 
prohibition on account of his having destroyed classified Air Force documents “by 
pouring animal blood on them,” but he nevertheless reentered Hickam Air Force 
Base in order to engage in a political demonstration.204 Accordingly, Albertini 
“required a decision as to whether the defendant’s entry onto the base was rightly 
viewed in isolation or as a part of a broader pattern of activity.”205 The Court took 
the latter path and applied intermediate scrutiny to his conviction for the prohibited 
entry, pursuant to O’Brien.206  
Several commentators have observed that Albertini represented an extension of 
O’Brien because it was the protestor’s reentry to the grounds of the base in violation 
of the bar letter, rather than his actual protest, that triggered the sanction.207 Unlike 
O’Brien’s draft-card incineration, which was itself communicative, in Albertini “the 
conduct that drew application of the law (the initial reentry) was not itself 
expressive.”208 The “relevant expressive behavior came only later, when Albertini 
thrust himself into the on-base demonstration.”209 
The border activists face an impasse similar to Albertini’s. In order to engage in 
their expressive conduct, they must either enter the park without a permit, or obtain 
a permit but disobey its conditions. In other words, no viable course of action is 
available that would allow them to engage in the speech activities for which they are 
being criminally prosecuted.210 Seen in this light, NMD’s need to enter the federal 
reserve is “intimately related” to the expressive conduct they wish to undertake 
there.211 Perhaps not all courts would agree, but the point is that even the access 
 
 
1272, 1289 (D. Ariz. 2020) (sustaining an RFRA defense to the unauthorized access 
convictions for other NMD defendants).  
 202. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 706 n.3 (1986) (emphasis added) 
(indicating that the O’Brien intermediate scrutiny rule would apply in this kind of situation). 
 203. 472 U.S. 675, 677 (1985). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Coenen, supra note 172, at 496. 
 206. Albertini, 472 U.S. at 688–89 (applying intermediate scrutiny to uphold defendant’s 
conviction for violating the bar letter). 
 207. See Coenen, supra note 172, at 482; Srinivasan, supra note 173, at 412; Geoffrey R. 
Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 110 (1987). 
 208. Srinivasan, supra note 173, at 412; see also Stone, supra note 207, at 110 (“The 
defendant presumably would have been punished even if he had reentered the base for a 
nonexpressive purpose.”). 
 209. Coenen, supra note 172, at 482.  
 210. Cf. United States v. Hoffman, 436 F. Supp. 3d 1272 (D. Ariz. 2020) (making a similar 
observance with respect to defendants’ RFRA claims). 
 211. Some scholars, including Dan Coenen, have expressed skepticism that Albertini 
“stands for the proposition that securing physical access to a site of speech should 
automatically qualify as intimately related to that speech.” Coenen, supra note 172, at 482. 
The discomfort appears to stem from trepidation about a rule that might allow unauthorized 
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restriction cannot be easily dismissed in this context as outside the First Amendment, 
especially since NMD’s activity occurs on presumptively accessible public land and 
does not employ force or fraud to gain entry.  
Returning again to the final O’Brien factor—the narrowness of the government’s 
restrictions on speech—it is apparent that the regulations, along with their 
enforcement through criminal sanctions, threaten to coerce NMD dissenters into 
abandoning the expressive conduct that takes on meaning precisely because of the 
location where it occurs.212 As a general matter, criminal penalties imposed on the 
basis of First Amendment activity are less tolerable than civil sanctions.213 To be 
sure, the Court has never fully embraced a “penalty-sensitive” approach to assessing 
“whether a restriction on speech violates the First Amendment in light of the severity 
of the punishment” imposed.214 Nevertheless, strands of that proportionality-based 
impulse run through many free speech settings in the Court’s First Amendment 
doctrine.215 The First Amendment vagueness and overbreadth doctrines in particular 
reflect “greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties.”216 
The reason is simple: when only civil penalties are at stake, “the consequences of 
imprecision are qualitatively less severe.”217 
Moreover, means by which the government could take a less restrictive approach 
with respect to the humanitarians’ speech are readily apparent. As the activists 
themselves have suggested, for example, the rules could be revised to allow them to 
 
 
entrants to violate generally applicable trespass law “simply because the trespasser wants to 
stand on my porch to denounce my political views.” Id. at 483; see also Frederick Schauer, 
Cuban Cigars, Cuban Books, and the Problem of Incidental Restrictions on Communications, 
26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 779, 787 (1985) (expressing skepticism that intermediate scrutiny is 
the appropriate test in “every trespass prosecution . . . solely because the trespasser trespassed 
for the purpose of communicating”). One possible response is that the worry seems overblown, 
given that generally applicable trespass laws would sail through intermediate scrutiny on 
account of the infringement on property rights held by other individuals that is wrought by a 
wrongful entry, along with the attendant concerns about violence that trespass laws regarding 
private property are designed to avert. But a limiting factor also lies within the facts of 
Albertini itself, which is that the defendant sought entry to government-controlled property in 
order to protest government policies. Thus, one could narrow the “intimate relation” extension 
of O’Brien to situations in which the unprotected part of a speaker’s conduct is a necessary 
component of expressive conduct directed at the government. This narrowing construction 
accords with the dissident-protecting, democracy-promoting values that the First Amendment 
is said to advance. See infra Section IV.A. 
 212. See supra Section III.A (discussing the importance of locale in attributing meaning to 
NMD’s activities). 
 213. See generally Dan T. Coenen, Freedom of Speech and the Criminal Law, 97 B.U. L. 
REV. 1533 (2017). 
 214. Michael Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions: Toward a Penalty-Sensitive Approach to 
the First Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 999 (2012) (emphasis in original).  
 215. See id. at 1002–15 (emphasis in original) (describing ad hoc approaches to penalty-
sensitive First Amendment analysis in contexts such as sedition, defamation, public 
employment, vagueness, overbreadth, indecency, and school speech). 
 216. Village of Hoffman Estates v. the Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–
99 (1982).  
 217. Id. at 499. See generally Coenen, supra note 213, at 1571 (explaining why people 
view criminal penalties as more harmful than civil penalties). 
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distribute water and other aid at predesignated locations.218 Put in terms of First 
Amendment doctrine, reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions would be far 
preferable to the current situation, in which NMD is granted no access at all or is 
criminally punished for engaging in expressive conduct.  
Alternatively, or in addition, activists could be required to continue to remove all 
trash they find, whether or not it consists of discarded water bottles that originated 
with NMD, as a condition of entry.219 Indeed, the record as developed in criminal 
prosecutions suggests that the activists may already have a positive impact on the 
environment in the region, as they employ a “practice of bringing garbage bags and 
picking up as much trash as possible.”220 
Finally, the government could swap out the scheme of criminal prosecutions in 
exchange for nominal civil penalties for permit violations, the proceeds of which 
could then be used to fund environmental preservation activities. While this would 
continue to burden speech, it would be less restrictive than the current scheme and 
would more clearly further the government’s asserted ecological interests, both of 
which factors would increase the chance that the regulations would survive 
intermediate scrutiny.  
Ultimately, the outcome of the O’Brien intermediate review, like other 
generalized balancing tests, may well turn on the relative weight a particular judge 
assigns each factor.221 While that adjudicative reality has long been criticized on 
grounds of facilitating judicial activism or inconsistency, the process does require 
the Court to analyze and articulate the relationship between the government’s 
asserted justifications and the burden on speech. Standards develop over time 
through this kind of case-by-case adjudication.  
In any event, the government’s punishment of key humanitarian activities 
engaged in by NMD cannot be summarily justified through the application of 
intermediate scrutiny. Moreover, judicial scrutiny in this context, even if less than 
strict, may have the salutary effect of encouraging the government to consider 
alternatives to outright prohibition and prosecution that allow NMD to engage in its 
expressive activities in at least a limited fashion. Finally, recognition of the speech-
inhibiting nature of the government’s approach opens the door to a more heightened 
review if it turns out that the law is being applied in a discriminatory fashion, as the 
next Section considers.  
2. Strict Scrutiny for Viewpoint or Speaker Discrimination 
Although the access and use regulations on their face comprise laws of general 
applicability that only incidentally burden speech, there is some basis to surmise their 
application here stems from government hostility toward particular viewpoints or 
 
 
 218. United States v. Hoffman, 436 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1289 (D. Ariz. 2020). 
 219. Id.  
 220. Id. at 1288. Federal agents’ own body camera footage showed one or more of the 
activists returning with a backpack full of “empty, crushed water bottles.” Id. 
 221. Cf. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 674 (2d ed. 1988) (noting 
that the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), due process balancing test “provides the 
Court a facile means to justify the most cursory procedures by altering the relative weights to 
be accorded each of the three factors”). 
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particular speakers. Eugene Volokh has argued that even generally applicable laws 
should trigger strict scrutiny when they are “content-based as applied.”222 Even 
without crystal clear evidence of viewpoint discrimination, some scholars suggest 
that heightened scrutiny may be warranted “if there exist special reasons to suspect 
a speech-restrictive motive” behind the government’s actions.223 This rule arguably 
should apply where it appears that the government is intentionally applying generally 
applicable laws in order to suppress dissenting speech.224 
One possible framing of the issues would examine the arrests of NMD activists 
as retaliation for protected speech.225 As the Supreme Court observed in Lozman v. 
City of Riviera Beach, “[T]here is a risk that some police officers may exploit the 
arrest power as a means of suppressing speech.”226 Indeed, some of the border arrests 
followed directly on the heels of NMD’s publication of a new report and video 
exposing CBP’s destruction of water and other alleged abuses.227 The timing at least 
suggests the possibility of retaliation. 
To be sure, the fact that federal agents likely had probable cause for the regulatory 
arrests at issue normally would defeat a claim of retaliation for protected speech.228 
Nevertheless, two exceptions to this general rule are potentially relevant in this 
context. First, in Lozman, the Court carved out an exception to the usual no-probable-
cause rule for asserting a First Amendment claim in an arrest context where the 
government action was taken pursuant to a “premeditated plan to intimidate” or an 
“official retaliatory policy.”229 In that case, the Court held that the plaintiff’s suit for 
civil damages could survive summary judgment, despite the existence of probable 
cause for his disorderly conduct arrest, because he could proffer “objective evidence 
of a policy motivated by retaliation” against his earlier protected speech.230  
This “premeditated plan” or “official retaliatory policy” theory might also find 
purchase in the context of the recent arrests of NMD activists. First, the localized 
 
 
 222. Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of 
Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 
1277, 1286–87 (2005); see also id. at 1292 (discussing Supreme Court decisions in which 
convictions were set aside “though the statutes involved were content-based only as applied, 
not on their face”). 
 223. Srinivasan, supra note 173, at 420; see also Kagan, supra note 184, at 499 (surmising 
that Supreme Court decisions applying “intermediate [scrutiny] to certain incidental 
restrictions may result . . . from a visceral sense that an illicit factor entered into a governmental 
decision—whether legislative, administrative, or judicial”). 
 224. See Srinivasan, supra note 173, at 420. 
 225. In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), 
claims of retaliatory prosecution are not viable unless there was no probable cause for the 
underlying criminal charge. The existence of probable cause generally bars retaliatory arrest 
claims, too, unless the retaliation at issue stems from an official policy or premeditated plan. 
Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945, 1954 (2018). 
 226. Id. at 1953. 
 227. Footage of Border Patrol Vandalism of Humanitarian Aid, 2010–2017, NO MORE 
DEATHS (Jan. 17, 2018), http://forms.nomoredeaths.org/footage-of-border-patrol-vandalism 
-of-humanitarian-aid-2010-2017/ [https://perma.cc/HVW9-VQ4P].  
 228. See Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1715–16 (2019). 
 229. 138 S. Ct. at 1954. 
 230. Id. 
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permit policy amendments—which for the first time specifically enumerated water 
bottles and other humanitarian-aid-related objects as “personal property” that could 
not be “abandoned” under the applicable park-use regulation—were issued 
contemporaneously with the Trump administration’s announcement of a zero-
tolerance approach to going after anyone who provides aid to unauthorized 
noncitizens.231 Even more revealing of an official retaliatory policy were the internal 
government emails between federal land managers and other federal agencies 
disclosed during the subsequent criminal trial against the activists, which suggested 
they were intentionally targeted by the new permit policy (and the arrests that would 
follow) because of federal managers’ disapproval toward the activists’ particular 
viewpoints about unauthorized migrants.232 Finally, the fact that suspected NMD 
volunteers apparently were placed on issue-no-permit blacklists at least raises an 
implication of animus toward them or their views.233  
The other potentially relevant qualification comes from Nieves v. Bartlett, in 
which the Court made clear that the usual no-probable-cause threshold for 
challenging governmental arrests that suppress speech should not apply in 
“circumstances where officers have probable cause to make arrests, but typically 
exercise their discretion not to do so.”234 The Court noted that warrantless arrests for 
public order misdemeanors, like jaywalking, raise special concerns because they 
increase the risk that officers’ discretionary arrest power might be used to suppress 
speech.235 Accordingly, the Court concluded that retaliatory arrest lawsuits should 
not be dismissed on the grounds that probable cause existed where the plaintiff can 
present objective evidence that she was arrested when other similarly situated 
individuals were not.236  
Discretionary arrests in the border regions might present such a situation in which 
violations of minor regulatory offenses are endemic but only particular violators are 
targeted. Notably, in the criminal trials against the activists, the government did not 
present evidence that other would-be visitors to the preserve were preemptively 
denied access or arrested for littering or other regulatory violations, although 
prosecutors would have had an incentive to do so to rebut the defendants’ RFRA 
claims. Moreover, as a general matter, the government has afforded wide latitude to 
privateers traveling to regions along the border to construct unofficial border walls 
and to vigilante nationalists rounding up migrants at gunpoint.237 Indeed, the efforts 
 
 
 231. See supra Section II.B and text accompanying note 178. 
 232. See supra Section II.B and text accompanying note 178. 
 233. See supra Section II.B and text accompanying note 178. Note that the blacklists 
operate as a prior restraint that suppresses a range of activities NMD hopes to engage in, not 
all of which violate regulatory prohibitions (e.g. mapping and honoring the dead). Further, 
even if government officials were mistaken in attributing particular political views to those 
preemptively denied permits, the First Amendment claim would still be viable. See Heffernan 
v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1413 (2016) (holding that employer could be sued in a 
First Amendment retaliation action for violating an employee’s free-speech rights even though 
the employer was mistaken in thinking that the employee had exercised those rights). 
 234. 139 S. Ct. at 1727. 
 235. Id. at 1727–29. 
 236. Id. at 1727.  
 237. See Debbie Nathan & Jordyn Rozensky, Private Border Wall Expands onto Federal 
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of such groups are often welcomed and celebrated by the Trump administration and 
its close allies, and their leaders enjoy a loud platform from which they defend and 
promote restrictionist viewpoints.238  
While the Lozman and Nieves speech-retaliation exceptions were developed in the 
context of suits for civil damages, the reasoning underlying those qualifications 
applies with equal (or even greater) force in situations where criminal punishment of 
the speaker hangs in the balance. Yick Wo v. Hopkins239 provides an useful analogy. 
That case pertained to a city ordinance requiring all laundries in wooden buildings 
to obtain a permit or face penalties. Not a single Chinese owner in the city was issued 
a permit, and those who then operated their laundries without permits were fined, 
and, if they refused to pay, jailed. The Court held that this selective enforcement of 
the permit law, despite its facial neutrality, violated the Equal Protection Clause. 
While that case concerned the Fourteenth Amendment, the unconstitutional-as-
applied nature of its reasoning would surely carry over into First Amendment 
scrutiny of a hypothetical laundry permit scheme discretionarily enforced in 
retaliation against (or animus toward) Republican-owned businesses, for example. 
In sum, the public record available at this point does not preclude the potential 
viability of a viewpoint- or speaker-based retaliatory arrest theory. And other frames 
are possible, too, including the prior restraint implications of the permitting process 
and the blacklists.240 To the extent that a court finds that the government indeed has 
applied the regulations in ways that discriminate against particular viewpoints or 
speakers, its burden of justification would intensify. 
Strict scrutiny in the First Amendment context would require the government to 
demonstrate that the regulations are “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 
 
 
Land, Blocking Access to Historic Site, INTERCEPT (June 11, 2019, 8:30 AM), 
https://theintercept.com/2019/06/11/private-border-wall-federal-land/ [https://perma.cc 
/64EW-BBK9]; Simon Romero, Militia in New Mexico Detains Asylum Seekers at Gunpoint, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/18/us/new-mexico 
-militia.html [https://perma.cc/JRK3-HPKA].  
 238. See Jason Hancock, Kobach Border Wall Group Announces Event Featuring Donald 
Trump Jr., Steve Bannon, KAN. CITY STAR (July 24, 2019, 4:38 PM), 
https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article233069892.html 
[https://perma.cc/6A82-LYG9]; Ben Schreckinger, MAGA All-Stars Visit Border to Plot 
Private Wall Project, POLITICO (Feb. 5, 2019, 2:28 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019 
/02/05/maga-border-private-wall-bannon-kobach-prince-1147210 [https://perma.cc/W97G 
-RY75]. 
 239. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
 240. See generally Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1037 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A 
permitting requirement is a prior restraint on speech and therefore bears a ‘heavy presumption’ 
against its constitutionality.” (quoting Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 
130 (1992))); Nathan W. Kellum, Permit Schemes: Under Current Jurisprudence, What 
Permits Are Permitted?, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 381, 392 (2008) (“In order to overcome the 
presumption of unconstitutionality, any permit scheme has a significant hurdle to clear.”); 
Marla Brooke Tusk, No-Citation Rules as a Prior Restraint on Attorney Speech, 103 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1202, 1226 (2003) (explaining that prior restraint in the First Amendment context is 
an expansive term “encompassing any attempt by a public official (including both 
administrative and judicial orders) to prevent speech in advance of its actual expression”).  
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interest.”241 For the reasons discussed in the previous Section, the government’s 
regulations as applied to NMD would almost certainly be found unconstitutional 
pursuant to strict scrutiny review. The administration’s implementation of the 
regulations through its permit scheme and aggressive arrests chills expression—to 
wit, it chills the activists’ critique of border policy as expressed through humanitarian 
conduct in this particular context. In turn, that approach constrains various 
audiences’ abilities to observe, process, and react to that viewpoint. Even if the 
government’s asserted interests in environmental protection and deterrence of 
unlawful migration are found to be compelling, its means of achieving those interests 
(i.e. through blacklists of suspected NMD members and criminal arrests based on 
their expressive activities) cannot be said to be narrowly tailored.242  
* * * 
I have argued that key parts of NMD’s humanitarian activity constitute speech 
and that under two analytic frameworks the government’s suppression of that speech 
may violate the Constitution. The final Part of this paper will turn to the normative 
claim that protecting NMD’s conduct advances democracy-promoting values, 
generating debate about border enforcement issues that are likely to become even 
more urgent in the years to come. Before turning to that discussion, however, the 
following Section addresses concerns that the foregoing speech analysis might lead 
to constitutional protection for repressive, undemocratic, or otherwise unsavory 
conduct. 
C. Slippery Slopes and Limiting Principles 
Skeptical readers might reasonably hold a concern that the foregoing analysis 
would support First Amendment protection for any actions taken pursuant to a set of 
values, including expressive activities that are repressive or violent. Indeed, at 
various points along the border, roving militia already round up migrants at gun 
point.243 Elsewhere in the region, citizens travel from afar to help construct private 
border walls.244 Should these kinds of activities also warrant free speech protection?  
As an initial matter, it is bedrock constitutional law that the First Amendment 
protects speech and speakers expressing views that many would find abhorrent. 
While there are long-established categories of unprotected speech, they do not 
include Ku Klux Klan rallies, hate speech, pornography, or many other offensive and 
hurtful kinds of communications.245 That said, it is also clear that when conduct 
 
 
 241. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990). 
 242. See generally Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments, 
Intractable Dilemmas, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1278 (1994) (discussing the means-ends 
inquiry of strict-scrutiny review). 
 243. Tim Gaynor, Desert Hawks: Paramilitary Veterans Group Stakes out US-Mexico 
Borderlands, AL JAZEERA AM. (Oct. 26, 2014), http://projects.aljazeera.com/2014/arizona-
border-militia/ [https://perma.cc/84AE-MWWT]. 
 244. See generally James M. Cooper, The Rise of Private Actors Along the United States-
Mexico Border, 33 WIS. INT’L L.J. 470 (2015). 
 245. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). See generally 
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involves violence or undue coercion, it fails to receive constitutional protection no 
matter how value-driven and communicative it might be. The terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, for example, were highly expressive, 
and no doubt were designed to communicate various messages to various audiences. 
Likewise, racially motivated violence, political assassination, and sexual assault may 
constitute intentionally communicative acts. And yet, such acts would not warrant 
constitutional protection.  
The reason that acts of violence or undue coercion fail to receive constitutional 
protection has to do with the impact of such speech on others. Those on the receiving 
end of this kind of expressive activity have their own individual rights to autonomy 
and participation in a free society.246 The First Amendment has always incorporated 
this kind of balancing of interests within a given social context, even if the balancing 
remains unarticulated. This claim tracks Professor Shanor’s sociologically based 
descriptive account of how courts actually determine whether to extend First 
Amendment coverage to expressive conduct.247 Where there is consensus in the 
relevant interpretive community that speech or conduct has a given effect, and if that 
effect is deemed harmful to the social order, courts tend to find the expression 
unprotected.248 For example, everyone agrees that prohibitions on murder or other 
violent crime are essential to the orderly functioning of society, putting them beyond 
the realm of an expression-based challenge.249 For similar reasons, not all forms of 
communication are protected by law, even those that consist of pure speech.250 
Thus, to the extent that any individual’s expressive activity—whether in the 
border regions or elsewhere—becomes violent, threatens to impede the bodily 
autonomy of others, or unduly restrains their capacity to engage in their own self-
development or social participation, that activity should remain outside of First 
Amendment coverage.251 On the other hand, nonviolent, noncoercive expressive 
activity, even if repressive, may well warrant First Amendment coverage in 
particular circumstances.  
To illustrate, suppose an anti-immigrant, pro-enforcement organization exists that 
calls itself “Yes More Deaths.” Its members might constitutionally exercise their 
 
 
Volokh, supra note 222, at 1283 (listing categories of unprotected speech, including “speech 
that advocates crime,” speech that explains how to commit crime, and “speech that creates an 
offensive work environment”). 
 246. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 51–73 (1989). 
 247. See Shanor, First Amendment Coverage, supra note 24, at 343. 
 248. Id. at 354–55. Sometimes the particular conduct is treated as if it lies outside the First 
Amendment altogether, while other times the balancing of interests is so clear that it barely 
warrants articulation. Either way, the same no-protection result is quickly reached. 
 249. Coenen, supra note 172, at 469 (“[S]ome legal prohibitions (beginning with murder 
laws) are so central to the social order that they should be deemed constitutionally 
unassailable.”). 
 250. See BAKER, supra note 246. 
 251. While there may be indeterminate grey areas concerning coverage, it is important to 
note that where the laws at issue with these kinds of activities target conduct that will not 
always be done for expressive reasons, they will receive only intermediate scrutiny. See supra 
Section III.B.1. If the draft card destruction ban was sustained in O’Brien pursuant to 
intermediate scrutiny review, “it should follow a fortiori that a law prohibiting the destruction 
of a human being would satisfy that same test.” Coenen, supra note 172, at 469 n.183.  
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speech rights to inscribe hateful messages to migrants on the water jugs left out by 
their humanitarian counterparts, yet they would search in vain for First Amendment 
protection were they to instead choose to contaminate the potable water with arsenic. 
Complications remain, of course, and there will always be hard cases, but the point 
is that recognizing humanitarian activity as expressive speech covered by the First 
Amendment in the very specific border region context examined in this Article does 
not mean that all value-driven conduct, humanitarian or otherwise, must receive 
constitutional protection. 
Other wary readers might connect the argument advanced herein with commercial 
entities’ recent mobilization to use free speech claims in the service of deregulation. 
A growing number of businesses have looked to the First Amendment to attack 
regulations that, they assert, infringe on protected speech.252 For the most part, this 
Article’s arguments are readily distinguishable from that project. A central objection 
to these deregulatory uses of free speech claims by commercial actors is that they 
undermine the very democracy-promoting values that the First Amendment is 
supposed to promote. As Tim Wu has observed, in cases like Sorrell v. IMS Health 
Inc.,253 the Court allowed profit-seeking business entities to make an end-run around 
their losses in far-reaching, fairly contested legislative processes by subsequently 
“reimagin[ing] themselves as politically disadvantaged speakers” within the First 
Amendment and then asking courts to intervene in ongoing political debate.254 When 
politically powerful groups can weaponize free speech to stop debate and stifle 
democracy, the First Amendment can be fairly said to “bit[e] its own tail.”255 Others 
portray this movement in even more dire terms, arguing that “if taken to its analytical 
conclusion,” free speech expansionism may “render self-government impossible.”256 
Scholars have proposed a number of doctrinal interventions to mitigate the anti-
democratic and destabilizing consequences of this particular brand of “First 
Amendment opportunism.”257 Some argue for a return to commercial speech first 
principles, which would relax constitutional scrutiny on economic regulations in 
light of the previously understood tenet that protection for commercial speech flowed 
only from its value to listeners, rather than from speaker autonomy principles.258 Wu, 
 
 
 252. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech & the First Amendment: History, 
Data, and Implications, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 223 (2015) (reporting the results of an empirical 
study showing that anti-regulatory free speech claims now outnumber any other kind of First 
Amendment claim). 
 253. 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
 254. Tim Wu, Beyond First Amendment Lochnerism: A Political Process Approach, 
KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. (Aug. 21, 2019), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/beyond-
first-amendment-lochnerism-a-political-process-approach [https://perma.cc/2KKW-AG2V].  
 255. Id.  
 256. Shanor, The New Lochner, supra note 24, at 138. Later in her analysis, Professor 
Shanor considerably softens the breadth of that dire prediction, though the residual concerns 
remain deeply troubling. Id. at 193 (“But despite the First Amendment’s deregulatory 
potential, it is highly unlikely. The First Amendment will instead stand ready to be mobilized 
against particularly controversial regulations.”) (emphasis in original). 
 257. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in ETERNALLY 
VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 175, 191–93 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. 
Stone eds., 2002). 
 258. See Shanor, The New Lochner, supra note 24, at 137, 146; see also Jason A. Cade, If 
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in turn, suggests that courts adopt a “process-driven approach” through which they 
should decline, on prudential grounds, to intervene in political disputes falling 
outside the political speech concerns at the heart of the First Amendment unless there 
is evidence of some kind of political process failure.259 
The essential problem underlying this so-called First Amendment Lochnerism is 
that it fails to consider carefully the “social, cultural, or economic context” in which 
any kind of speech arises.260 Speech is not a free-floating, natural right; rather, as 
revealed in the preceding discussion, whether a particular expression has 
constitutional valence against a particular governmental attempt to suppress it must 
turn on deep engagement with the social context.261 If Shanor’s descriptive account 
of the sociological basis for First Amendment coverage is taken seriously, then to a 
significant degree the focus of administrative regulatory action and transactional 
rules would remain outside of the Free Speech Clause altogether, or alternatively, be 
subject only to rational basis scrutiny.262  
At the end of the day, these pathologies lay to the side of this Article, which 
endeavors to explain why some kinds of humanitarian activism in this very particular 
border region context constitute core political speech. This is the speech of activist 
dissidents; they are political outsiders, rather than well-resourced corporations. This 
speech, if recognized and protected as such, seeks to initiate debate about a topic of 
significant public importance, rather than to end it. This speech is non-violent and 
nondiscriminatory, unlike conduct that begins to infringe on others’ personal 
autonomy and liberty, requiring difficult balancing of interests. That different 
audiences will interpret and act upon NMD’s work in diverse ways is clear, of course, 
but this fact only serves to distinguish it further from the commercial speech context 
and to argue for its robust protection under the First Amendment. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEMOCRACY-PROTECTING FUNCTIONS OF THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
The previous Parts of this Article focused on the contextual details of border 
activists’ expressive humanitarianism and the free speech concerns raised by the 
government’s attempts to silence it. In this final Part, I turn to a broader discussion 
of the attendant implications for the democracy-promoting values of the First 
Amendment. First, I reiterate with more precision how NMD’s activities contribute 
 
 
the Shoe Fits: Kasky v. Nike and Whether Corporate Statements About Business Operations 
Should Be Deemed Commercial Speech, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 247, 258 (2004) (“Because the 
constitutional and economic policy values of commercial speech extend no further than the 
speech’s use to the listener, non-deceptiveness is a prerequisite to its utility, and therefore to 
its protection.”). 
 259. Wu, supra note 254. 
 260. Shanor, The New Lochner, supra note 24, at 187–88. 
 261. See supra Sections III.A and III.B. See generally Post, Recuperating First Amendment 
Doctrine, supra note 25, at 1273. 
 262. See generally Shanor, First Amendment Coverage, supra note 24 (explaining why a 
host of regulatory contexts and institutional settings are the kind where a relatively unified 
audience has shared understandings of the norms and effects of speech, and thus expanding 
free speech coverage to those contexts would upset cohesive social orders).  
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to democratic knowledge about the real-world consequences of border policy, 
facilitating the possibility of more informed debate around appropriate responses to 
migration. I then briefly turn to an urgent topic raised by NMD’s expressive 
conduct—namely, whether humanitarian aid should ever be a crime. Allowing 
humanitarian activists to engage in this kind of work could eventually precipitate a 
new right likely to be of central importance as migration pressures continue to rise. 
A. Experience-Based Formation of Democratic Knowledge 
As detailed in the preceding discussion, the Trump administration has frequently 
employed dehumanizing, siege-narrative rhetoric when discussing migrants who 
arrive at the southern border.263 While the President’s most receptive audience may 
be white nationalists and his far-right base,264 his rhetoric emboldens all Americans 
to dehumanize migrants and to justify border policies that result in suffering or death. 
In the official narrative, now accepted and retold by portions of the public, migrants 
are invaders coming to commit crimes, “take our jobs,” or “change our way of life.” 
Regardless, they comprise an existential threat to be eliminated or at least radically 
reduced.265 
Dominant groups employ stock stories in order to construct a reality that justifies 
their social position.266 In the context of border enforcement, the enduring 
rationalization is that Americans are simply doing what is necessary to protect 
against terrorists, criminals, or other invaders. It is an innocence-preserving narrative 
designed to hide the infliction and disregard of significant suffering.267 The 
humanitarian activists who reveal the deadly consequences of border policies, and 
who demonstrate care and compassion for migrants, simultaneously protest the 
official narrative and make visible knowledge and stories that might otherwise 
remain unknown, which in turn can be used to construct new frames and argue for 
new policies.268  
In particular, by undertaking their arduous border-region treks, distributing water 
jugs, and honoring the remains of the deceased, borderland activists allow Americans 
to begin to attribute new meanings to a place they have never been. Their work 
 
 
 263. See supra Part I. 
 264. Arsalan Iftikhar, Trump Sees Immigrants as Invaders. White-Nationalist Terrorists 
Do, Too., WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2019, 2:19 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook 
/2019/03/17/trump-sees-immigrants-invaders-white-nationalist-terrorists-do-too/ 
[https://perma.cc/E8BH-QNMA].  
 265. Cade, supra note 30, at 480 (“The current executors of the removal system see 
enforcement targets as interchangeable numbers or chits—nameless, faceless others, to be 
eliminated or reduced—rather than individual human beings with unique life stories and loved 
ones.”). 
 266. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 
87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2437–38 (1989) (“Most oppression . . . does not seem like oppression 
to those perpetrating it. It is rationalized, causing few pangs of conscience.”).  
 267. Cf. Shelby Steele, I’m Black, You’re White, Who’s Innocent?, HARPER’S MAG., June 
1, 1988, at 45 (arguing that “innocence-giving myths” are employed to validate the status quo). 
 268. Cf. Fan, supra note 48, at 720 (“The water tanks also encapsulate a critique of the 
federal government’s policy that pushes migrants to the most dangerous parts of the desert.”).  
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replaces bare statistics with more visceral details—individuals, bodies and bones, 
and crosses. Through the expressive conduct of groups like NMD, various audiences 
might learn (whether first-hand or through subsequent transmission) that when 
migrants die in the desert, they first lose their faces and fingers as insects, vultures, 
and coyotes prey upon their bodies,269 or that migrants experiencing hyperthermia 
“begin to cook from the inside, accelerating decomposition after death,” becoming 
unrecognizable after just a single hot desert day.270  
These witnessed accounts provide far more powerful tools of persuasion than does 
a generic statement about border policies pushing migrants into deadly terrain. As 
Richard Delgado explained, effective stories can be more powerful than litigation 
when it comes to displacing stock narratives and establishing new norms.271 NMD’s 
witnessed stories convey the actual consequences of official deterrence policies, 
instead of the imagined abstractions that would otherwise prevail.272 Counter-stories, 
when effective, are deeply registered and constructive: 
It is through this process that we can overcome ethnocentrism and the unthinking 
conviction that our way of seeing the world is the only one — that the way things are 
is inevitable, natural, just, and best — when it is, for some, full of pain, exclusion, 
and both petty and major tyranny.273 
It is unclear, ex ante, where a richer public discussion—one informed not just by 
official orthodoxy but also by the democratic knowledge that border activists help to 
construct—will eventually take us. But the uncertain outcome of the discussion is 
part of the point. Protecting key parts of the dissenters’ humanitarian work in this 
context from excessive government punishment furthers the classic First 
Amendment value of “promot[ing] diversity of ideas” in public debate.274 We gain 
democratic knowledge from their experiences and their expression of those 
experiences.275 Even just bare awareness of the organization’s work in border regions 
begins to transform the social construction of those locales and their expressive 
 
 
 269. Devereaux, supra note 47.  
 270. Reineke, supra note 55, at 152–53. 
 271. Delgado, supra note 266, at 2429. 
 272. Activists in groups like NMD do not hold a monopoly on the construction of counter-
stories in the borderlands. Militiamen and anti-immigrant restrictionists—for example, also 
engage in a project of storytelling. Noncitizens—especially the migrants themselves—also 
have something to say about the merits of current border enforcement policy. See Daniel I. 
Morales, “Illegal” Migration Is Speech, 92 IND. L.J. 735 (2017) [hereinafter Morales, 
“Illegal” Migration]. Their stories differ significantly from the stock narrative told within the 
United States in viewpoint, content, and tone, and would therefore offer an important 
contribution to public discussion. But at the same time, it is indisputable that their views are 
given little weight, on account of their outsider status. See Daniel I. Morales, Immigration 
Reform and the Democratic Will, 16 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 49 (2013). NMD, as a 
collection of citizen dissenters, thus gives voice to the silenced—or at least discounted—
voices of migrant outsiders. Cf. Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century: 
Ten Lessons from the Twentieth Century, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 273, 277 (2009) (arguing that in 
the “realm of free speech” the likelihood of disadvantaging minority voices is “especially 
potent”). 
 273. Delgado, supra note 266, at 2439. 
 274. MAGARIAN, supra note 21, at xvii. 
 275. See Morales, “Illegal” Migration, supra note 272, at 761. 
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aspects. As I have argued, these counternarratives would be ineffective, if not 
impossible, without action of this particular kind and in this particular place.  
To summarize: By galvanizing awareness of and support for their dissenting 
conduct, the humanitarian activists materialize alternative accounts of how humans 
can or should treat each other. In these ways, they “build consensus . . . and deeper, 
more vital ethics.”276 Recognizing the expressive conduct like the kind engaged in 
by NMD as constitutionally protected speech activity thus promotes vital democratic 
values that the First Amendment is intended to safeguard.277 
B. Toward a Right to Rescue? 
Despite the Trump administration’s aggressive efforts to deter asylum seekers on 
the border, migrants continue to arrive, seeking refuge from violence, economic 
strife, and the ravages of climate change.278 Because the conditions that drive 
migrants north likely will continue to worsen, efforts to “seal the border” will 
inevitably lead more migrants to risk their lives through even more dangerous land 
and water border crossings. It is therefore a matter of growing urgency that 
Americans robustly debate whether and how border policy can be both effective and 
ethical.  
NMD’s work raises a number of challenging questions about the morality of 
border policy, but one aspect of their activity is of key importance: Should 
humanitarian aid ever be a crime? Or, put differently, does an ethical border policy 
suggest the need for a right to rescue without fear of criminal prosecution? 
France—one of the many European Union countries currently experiencing 
significant forced migration pressure—recently confronted this very question. Cedric 
Herrou, a farmer living near France’s border with Italy, was convicted on the basis 
of helping migrants in distress.279 Pressing his appeal to the French Constitutional 
Council, Herrou succeeded in convincing the high court to recognize a right to 
provide humanitarian aid to unauthorized migrants, so long as there was no 
 
 
 276. Delgado, supra note 266, at 2414. 
 277. A related but distinct value that the First Amendment’s protection of speech and 
expression is theorized to safeguard is the facilitation of individual autonomy and self-
definition. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. 
L. REV. 1175, 1176, 1232–43 (1996) (arguing that the First Amendment protects values like 
“facilitating the wide-open search for truth and accommodating valued exercises of personal 
self-expression”). 
 278. See, e.g., Sarah Bermeo, Could Foreign Aid Help Stop Central Americans from 
Coming to the U.S.? Here’s What You Need to Know, WASH. POST (June 18, 2019, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/18/trump-administration-threatened-cut-
foreign-aid-if-central-american-countries-dont-stem-migration/ [https://perma.cc/FWD4-
R4HS]; Jacob Soboroff & Julia Ainsley, Trump Admin Ignored Its Own Evidence of Climate 
Change’s Impact on Migration from Central America, NBC NEWS (Sept. 21, 2019, 9:26 AM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/trump-admin-ignored-its-own-evidence 
-climate-change-s-impact-n1056381 [https://perma.cc/8JNW-THYV].  
 279. Josh Jacobs & Sam Schechner, French Court Rules in Favor of Humanitarian Aid to 
Illegal Migrants, WALL ST. J. (July 6, 2018, 3:47 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/french 
-court-rules-in-favor-of-humanitarian-aid-to-illegal-migrants-1530906461 [https://perma.cc 
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remuneration.280 The court located this right in the concept of “fraternity” that 
appears in the maxim introducing Article Two of the French Constitution.281 Perhaps 
recognizing the fragility of this newly discovered right, the Constitutional Court 
urged France’s legislative body to adopt the rule by statute, which it did in 2018.282  
The symbolic dissent of groups like NMD may well ignite a similar right-
generative moment in the United States, particularly if it is protected from 
government suppression. Zick has referred to our right to freedom of speech as 
dynamic, because it is the vehicle through which we advocate for and access other 
freedoms.283 Robert Post has similarly noted that “speech is special” because it 
“uniquely serves as the precondition to the very existence of social institutions and 
practices.”284 In Dan Coenen’s words, speech “is the matrix, the indispensable 
condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.”285 Thus, NMD’s performance of 
rescue and respect is both substance and process, functioning as expression of core 
beliefs while at the same time working toward the recognition of new rights.286 
The outcomes of the two felony prosecutions against Scott Warren for multiple 
charges of harboring unauthorized noncitizens, especially taken together, are at least 
suggestive of the possibility that some Americans may already be primed to think 
that some kind of right to rescue should exist. Despite facing the possibility of twenty 
years in prison if convicted, Warren took the stand in both trials and essentially 
admitted to all of the conduct (though not the criminal or conspiratorial intent) 
charged by the government. In June 2019, a deadlocked jury was unable to reach a 
verdict in his first trial, with eight jurors voting in favor of acquittal on all charges.287 
Federal prosecutors retried Warren on two of the charges in November 2019, this 
time resulting in a full acquittal.288  
 
 
 280. Id. 
 281. CONSTITUTION OF FRANCE tit. I, art. 2, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution 
/France_2008.pdf?lang=en [https://perma.cc/TD8C-UVRF]. This may have been the first 
instance in French jurisprudence in which “fraternity” provided an independent source of 
rights. See generally Jeremie Gilbert & David Keane, Equality Versus Fraternity? Rethinking 
France and Its Minorities, 14 INT’L J. CONST. L. 883, 898–904 (2017) (“Fraternity has never 
appeared as a solo term or value in decisions of the Constitutional Court, only ever cited along 
with liberty and equality.”).  
 282. Associated Press, French Courts Face Touchy Test: Is Helping Migrants a Crime?, 
VOA NEWS (Nov. 21, 2019, 12:25 PM), https://www.voanews.com/europe/french-courts-
face-touchy-test-helping-migrants-crime [https://perma.cc/5GVC-CFCP]. The law allows 
humanitarian help to be given to migrants already inside France, but only if there is 
compensation in return. Id. 
 283. Zick, supra note 21. 
 284. Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, supra note 25, at 1272. 
 285. Coenen, supra note 172, at 467 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 
(1937)). 
 286. Cf. Shalini Bhargava Ray, The Law of Rescue, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 619, 654 (2020) 
(arguing for recognition of a right to rescue migrants based on the freedom of association). 
 287. Matt Shuham, Mistrial for Border Volunteer Charged With Felonies for Aiding 
Migrants, TALKING POINTS MEMO (June 12, 2019), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/news/scott 
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 288. Paul Ingram, Scott Warren to be retried on 2 migrant harboring charges, TUCSON 
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Across the two prosecutions, then, twenty out of twenty-four jurors considered 
and rejected the claim that his humanitarian impulses should be punished as a crime, 
essentially nullifying the Arizona U.S. Attorney’s decision to bring the full hammer 
of the law down upon the activist.289 To be sure, none of the jurors willing to speak 
with press following the acquittal characterized the result as nullification.290 But “we 
all agreed,” one juror emphasized, “what he and these people do is fantastic.”291 
However one labels it, at the end of the day, the mistrial followed by the acquittal 
stands as a message to prosecutors that they overreached in this context.292  
NMD’s acts of symbolic resistance to official policy and rhetoric, undertaken with 
the goal of promoting the rights to save lives and to honor the dead, serve to disrupt 
other citizens’ complacency with current border policies. To be clear, I do not mean 
to suggest that all forms of aid or rescue should or will be immune from prosecution 
by virtue of development of a right to rescue.293 Rather, the point is that the activists’ 
expressive work initiates difficult conversations that the public needs to be having 
about an effective but ethical border policy, one that might one day include a right to 
rescue.294  
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that the central components of NMD’s humanitarian work 
amount to expressive conduct within the ambit of the First Amendment. 
Symbolically sharing water and honoring the remains of the deceased in this 
particular context serve to humanize migrants and to call attention to some of the 
costs of border policies. The activists hope to improve migration discourse and 
achieve desired legal reforms. Their work therefore may push society toward a more 
 
 
 289. Cf., e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Jury Nullification Checks Prosecutorial Power, in 
CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 551, 552 (2011) (“[W]e need the threat of nullification every 
day to deter prosecutors from enforcing the intentionally overbroad parts of the law in cases 
where the public would not approve.”). 
 290. Indeed, one juror specifically disavowed that explanation. Ryan Devereaux, 
Humanitarian Volunteer Scott Warren Reflects on the Borderlands and Two Years of 
Government Persecution, THE INTERCEPT 10 (Nov. 23, 2019), 
https://theintercept.com/2019/11/23/scott-warren-verdict-immigration-border/ 
[https://perma.cc/XR8F-L7RV]. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 208–09 (1977) (“In the United 
States, at least, almost any law which a significant number of people would be tempted to 
disobey on moral grounds would be doubtful—if not clearly invalid—on constitutional 
grounds as well.”). 
 293. For an in-depth exploration of the current law of rescue and arguments about how it 
should develop, see Ray, supra note 286. 
 294. Ideally, Congress would enact statutory provisions setting forth the kinds of 
humanitarian aid that should not be punishable as a federal crime. To the extent it does not, 
however, judges may nevertheless employ various means to narrow the reach of statutes 
imposing criminal penalties on at least some humanitarian conduct. See supra Part III (arguing 
that expressive humanitarian aid triggers application of the First Amendment); Ray, supra note 
286, 663–70 (outlining how religious exemptions and canons of statutory interpretation such 
as the rule of lenity allow judges to narrow the reach of federal harboring law). 
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humane conception of immigration enforcement, and, ideally, reshape prevailing 
norms.295 Consensus about border policies is not possible, of course, but robust 
debate, as well as peaceful co-existence in a diverse society, depends in part on 
allowing disparate viewpoints to emerge, including those that challenge the status 
quo. What this Article has shown is that the First Amendment should operate to 
safeguard at least some forms of nonviolent, expressive humanitarian dissent from 
excessive government suppression. Ultimately, this may serve as a catalyst for the 
recognition and development of a right to save others for humanitarian reasons. 
 
 
 295. Cf. Cade, supra note 30, at 496 (making this argument about sanctuary entities). 
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